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BUT DID THEY LISTEN? 
THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY 
COMMISSION'S EXERCISE IN 
ABOLITIONISM: A REPLY 
Robert Blecker1 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 2, 2007, the New Jersey Death Penalty Study 
Commission, with one dissenting vote, declared itself "pleased" 
to submit its report and recommendations to the Governor. 2 
The Commission had reached consensus: The legislature should 
simply abolish the death penalty and substitute life without 
parole.3 Although they personally supported capital 
punishment, some Commissioners voted to abolish it, 
despairing that the state's "liberal" Supreme Court would never 
1 Robert Blecker, a graduate of Harvard Law School (1974) and a Harvard 
University Fellow in Law and Humanities (1976-1977), teaches Criminal Law; 
Constitutional History; and the Death Penalty at New York Law School. 
2 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM'N REPORT (2007) [hereinafter COMM'N 
REPORT] (introductory letter from Chairman Rev. M. William Howard, Jr.), 
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
3 Id. at 1-2, 8. 
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allow an execution to take place. 4 Why dangle false hope before 
irate and grieving victims' families?s 
The Commission majority, however, probably concluded, as 
it began, with an abiding conviction that capital punishment 
violated human dignity. 
Legislation establishing the Commission had directed it to 
"study all aspects of the death penalty" - a literally impossible 
task. 6 During five public hearings, a parade of witnesses - some 
invited legal experts or religious leaders, others family members 
of the slain - exposed weaknesses and problems with the 
(non)administration of the death penalty and mostly rebutted 
an occasional advocate who did defend the punishment orally 
and in writing.7 
"The people of the State of New Jersey have been greatly 
served," the Chair declared in the final report, sending the 
Legislature and Governor the near unanimous proposal to 
abolish capital punishment. 8 The Commission, he assured the 
public, had "shown respectful regard for the differing 
perspectives that exist."9 
But had it? We who feel certain that justice demands the 
death of a mass murdering child rapist did not feel respectfully 
regarded. The Chair, Reverend William Howard, other 
members of the Commission and staff were gracious, helpful 
and polite, even in disagreement, welcoming retributivist 
advocates to speak and submit written statements.10 And the 
official transcript of the hearings does record our testimony.11 
Yet reviewing the Commission report and its recommendations 
4 Id. at 94 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study 
Comm'n). 
5 Id. at 93-96. 
6 S. 709, 211th Leg., 321 (N.J. 2006). 
7 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-20. 
8 Id. at Statement from the Chairman. 
9Id. 
10 See, e.g., id. at 27-51 (statement of R. Erik Lillquist). 
11 Id. at 29. 
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can't help but make us wonder: Although we spoke and wrote, 
did they listen? 
Locally and internationally hailed as comprehensive and 
complete,12 on many essential issues, the Commission's final 
report fails to engage the complexity of the great debate. 
Unbalanced and biased, it does not even mention any 
alternative to abolition or standing pat. 
Now, immediately following the fall 2007 elections, under 
cover of the Commission's recommendation and report, New 
Jersey stands poised to become the first state in the modern era 
legislatively to abolish the death penalty. Other states may 
follow that lead. Some state legislatures might even reflect 
popular will and restore it. Abolish or retain the death penalty, 
the People's representatives should balance the equities and 
focus firmly on the most essential issue which the Commission 
avoided: Justice. This witness repeatedly attempted without 
much effect, through personal appearance and written 
submission and follow-up, to inform the Commission.13 An 
abiding conviction that the people would have their legislature 
focus where the Commission failed, and a continuing 
commitment to justice after a better informed debate compels 
this counter-report. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS 
Responding to seven specific questions from the 
legislature,14 the Commission based its final recommendation to 
abolish the death penalty on seven specific findings, and added 
an eighth of its own.1s 
Let's take them one by one. 
12 Schwaneberg, Robert, Panel Calls for a Ban on NJ Executions: Corzine, 
Top Legislators BackLife w/o Parole, STAR LEDGER, Jan. 3, 2007. 
13 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 55 (Oct. 11, 
2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006] (testimony of Robert Blecker), 
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/DPSC 
101106.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
14 S. 709, 211th Leg., 32i. (N.J. 2006). 
15 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. 
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FINDING (1) THERE IS NO COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT 
THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY RATIONALLY SERVES A 
LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTENT.16 
The Commission's first finding incorporated the legislature's 
awkwardly phrased question, but with a twist. 17 What is a 
"legitimate penological intent?" Penological "intent" must 
mean - "purpose," "goal," or "justification." Traditionally, 
punishment serves as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, and/or a method to express social solidarity.18 
Rehabilitation 
Of course death, an irreversible extinction, cannot 
rehabilitate a person in this world. Some religious outlooks 
historically and today may see death as expiation, allowing the 
murderer to pay the price here and prepare to enter the 
Everlasting with a clean slate. The Commission well avoided 
this theological thicket. A secular society constitutionally 
committed to separating religion and law must assume death 
does not rehabilitate those we legally execute. 
Relative isolation of death-row, however, might encourage 
the Condemned to contemplate their crimes, take responsibility, 
allowing them to grow remorseful and humane, whereas life in 
general population might undermine that growth, forcing 
prisoners into self-protection, and promotion of prison schemes 
to survive and thrive. Again, rightly, the Commission did not 
address this. For the Commission's purposes, and ours here, the 
death penalty cannot be justified as rehabilitation. 
Incapacitation 
Executed murderers, of course, will never kill again. If 
instead we imprison them for life without parole, they may kill 
fellow prisoners, or staff. Still, we cannot justify taking 
prisoners' lives solely because we cannot safely confine them. 
16 Id. at 24. 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 Id. at 1, 24. 
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We can and we should design and administer prisons to keep us 
safe from the prisoners we confine. Incapacitation alone cannot 
justify the death penalty. 
Deterrence 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the death penalty 
must either generally deter or serve retributive ends.19 Although 
"deterrence" was the sole "penological intent" specifically listed 
by the New Jersey state legislature,2° polls show that the 
American majority who support the death penalty (and 
probably, too, most of those who oppose it) do not find 
deterrence their primary issue. 21 
In essays and repeatedly in testimony before the 
Commission, abolitionists flatly insisted that the death penalty 
"really has no general deterrent effect", characterizing 
arguments supporting deterrence as "totally implausible"22 and 
"not empirically supportable."2 3 "It's clear that the death 
penalty has never been a deterrent."2 4 At one public hearing, 
the Commission's lone dissenter momentarily joined his 
opponents and stretched their attack beyond reason: "I don't 
believe any penalty is a deterrent."2s 
19 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 233 (1976). 
20 S. 709, 211th Leg., 321 (N.J. 2006). 
21 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 36. 
22 See, e.g., COMM'N MEETINGS OF N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM'N 9 
(Aug. 16, 2006) [hereinafter COMM'N MEETINGS] (testimony of J. John J. 
Gibbons), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/ 
DPSC081606.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
2 3 Id. at 11. 
2 4 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 9 (Sept. 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006] (testimony of N.J. Sen. 
Raymond J. Lesniak), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub 
/pubhear/DPSC091306.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
2 s Id. at 130 (testimony of John F. Russo, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study 
Comm'n). 
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Those death penalty opponents - abolitionists who make the 
patently ridiculous claim that "the death penalty simply does not 
deter anybody" - unnecessarily make their own position more 
difficult. Of course the death penalty deters some people. As 
the Royal Commission (1949-1953) observed in its lengthy and 
detailed report, "We can number its failures. But we cannot 
number its successes."26 We can never know how many people 
who would have otherwise committed murder stopped 
themselves because, and only because of the threat of 
punishment. 2 7 
The deterrence question, really, is not whether the death 
penalty deters - sometimes it surely does -- but whether, on 
balance, it deters more effectively than its principal alternative, 
life (without parole). Better informed abolitionists, then, make 
the more modest claim that the death penalty no more 
powerfully deters than life in prison. They claim that studies 
either confirm this failure of deterrence, or at least fail to 
establish the death penalty's marginally more powerful 
deterrent effect. 2 s 
During their hearings, the Commission did focus on 
deterrence. 2 9 This much was common ground among the real 
experts: Several recent sophisticated studies seem to confirm a 
substantially greater deterrent effect of the death penalty - but 
only when used regularly.3° Critics attacked these studies at the 
hearings.31 The Commission report relied on Columbia Law 
School Professor Jeffrey Fagan's skillful and relentless critique, 
diminishing the studies' persuasive power.32 
2 6 ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT, 1953, [Crud. 
8932], at 20 [hereinafter ROYAL COMM'N]. 
2 7 Id. 
2 8 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-26. 
2 9 Id. at 24-29. 
3o Id. at 27. 
31 See, e.g., id. at 26. 
32Id. 
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For example, all but one of the studies group all types of 
murder together, claiming that all are equally deterred by the 
death penalty. However, many murders are not planned in 
advance but are committed impulsively or in a sudden outburst 
of rage. It is not logical, according to Professor Fagan, to believe 
that such defendants would respond rationally to threats of 
punishment. 33 
Murderers largely moved by momentary passion, the 
argument goes, give little thought to the consequences as they 
kill.34 The very remote possibility of their own execution 
someday in the distant future cannot and does not stop them 
here and now.35 
In 1999, however, when the New Jersey legislature amended 
the statute, adding the "violation of domestic violence 
restraining order" as an aggravating circumstance making the 
intentional killer death eligible,36 legislators must have believed 
that the remote threat of death could restrain passionate 
homicidal impulses of rejected lovers where court-issued 
restraining orders failed. Perhaps the legislature's "penological 
intent" was retribution and not deterrence. Perhaps they added 
this aggravator because in their view - although not in mine -
those who disobey court orders and kill shall die.37 
Many undeterrable passion killings qualify as manslaughter 
but not murder. And only the very worst passion murderers -
such as sadistic torture killers - deserve to die. For centuries 
we've believed, all other things equal, premeditated cold-
blooded killings deserve greater punishment than passion 
killing. And although certain murderers - international or 
domestic terrorists who kill in order to achieve a martyr's death 
- are by definition undeterrable, other cold blooded killers, e.g. 
professional assassins, may be most deterrable and also deserve 
to die. 
33Id. at 25. 
34Id. 
35 Id. at 24-25. 
36 S. 947, 208th Leg., 2090). (N.J. 1999). 
37 Id. 
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Early deterrence advocates such as Jeremy Bentham 
portrayed human beings as rational and calculating, weighing 
costs against benefits, discounting future threats of pain by their 
uncertainty and delay.38 Thus, as the NJ Commission Report 
emphasized, since "less than 1 percent of those who commit 
murder nationwide ultimately receive the death penalty and less 
than one-half of that small number are executed," the death 
penalty could not be expected to deter a would-be murderer who 
rationally considered the odds.39 
But this ignores basic human nature: When it comes to 
dying, most people, except extreme action seekers, go to great 
lengths to avoid deadly risks. We willingly sacrifice near-certain 
pleasure to spare ourselves remote risks of disaster. There is 
nothing "irrational" about this. Nor, flipping it, do we act 
irrationally in making small but certain sacrifices in order to 
achieve remotely possible future rewards - buying a lottery 
ticket for $1 although the chances are one in a hundred million 
of winning $20 million. 
Classically, punishment's effectiveness as a deterrent 
depends, in Bentham's words, not only upon its certainty, but 
also its celerity.4° Thus the Commission also noted that, "as a 
practical matter, the length of time that convicted murderers ... 
serve on death row argues against the usefulness of the death 
penalty as a deterrent."41 In the tradition of Bentham, the 
Commission saw potential killers as either passionate and 
unrestrainable, or rational and dismissing as tiny any possibility 
of being put to death.42 
Punishment, however, as the Royal Commission noted, may 
restrain human beings subconsciously.43 "[T]he deterrent force 
of capital punishment operates not only by affecting the 
38 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K Ogden ed., Richard 
Hildreth trans., Morrison and Gibb Ltd. 1950) (1864). 
39 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
4° BENTHAM, supra note 38, at 326. 
41 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29. 
42Jd. 
43 ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 26, at 20. 
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conscious thoughts of individuals tempted to commit murder, 
but also by building up in the community, over a long period of 
time, a deep feeling of peculiar abhorrence for the crime of 
murder."44 
Abolitionists counter with the death penalty's so-called 
"brutalization effect": Condemning to death, then killing 
helpless defendants, the Government subconsciously reinforces 
a belief in all potential killers that killing is alright. 45 While the 
Commission expounded on this highly speculative subconscious 
brutalization hypothesis,46 it completely ignored subconscious 
forces supporting deterrence cited by the British Commission47 
which this witness personally brought to their attention. 48 
Instead, determined to marshal evidence against capital 
punishment, the Commission report cited Richard Dieter for the 
well-known but misleading observation that "states without a 
death penalty have far lower murder rates than the states with 
the death penalty."49 Of course, Washington D.C., with its own 
criminal code and prison system, but without a death penalty, 
has had a much higher murder rate than neighboring Virginia or 
Maryland, both capital jurisdictions.so The abolitionist spin can 
omit this fact, however, because D.C. is a "district" and not a 
state. Furthermore, comparing counties within a state, the 
effective unit of death penalty prosecution, the death penalty's 
marginal deterrent effect increases.s1 But, again, conveniently 
44Jd. 
45 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. 
46Jd. 
47 ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 26, at 20. 
48 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 50 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
49 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. 
5o DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2005 (2006) (these statistics are based on both murder and 
nonnegligent manslaughter), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius 
/data/table_o5.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
51 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 42-44 (quoting Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 
2006, supra note 13, at 9-11) (Oct. 11, 2007) (testimony of J. David S. Baime). 
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neither the Executive Director of the abolitionist Death Penalty 
Information Center nor the similarly abolitionist Commission 
chose to mention this inconvenient fact. 
And if they were really about max1m1zmg capital 
punishment's deterrent effect, confining themselves to rational, 
conscious decision-making, the Commission might have 
proposed refining and narrowing the death penalty to the worst 
of the worst, and thereafter more regularly seeking and applying 
it to a much smaller class of monsters.s2 This witness urged the 
Commission orally and in writing to do this, providing a 
blueprint for a morally refined death penalty regime.s3 The 
Newark Star-Ledger headlined and highlighted that testimony 
- "Prof wants execution saved for 'the worst of the worst'."s4 
Bent on abolitionism, the Commission completely ignored the 
plea. Instead, sandwiched between sustained scholarly attacks 
on deterrence the Commission did quote Kent Scheidegger, a 
leading death penalty supporter and legal director of the 
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.ss The death penalty "'does 
have a deterrent effect and does save innocent lives if it is 
actually enforced'," Scheidegger observed.s6 But "New Jersey 
does not have an effective death penalty because our 'court of 
last resort is determined to block it and willing to twist the law 
to do so'."s7 
The Commission report did not cite Scheidegger's specific 
examples of blatant judicial abolitionism cloaked as analysis.ss 
52 Robert Blecker, A Road Not Considered, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
53 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 50 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
54 Robert Schwaneberg, Prof Wants Execution Saved for 'the Worst of the 
Worst', NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 12, 2006, at 37. 
55 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 8-9 (Oct. 
25, 2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006] (testimony of Kent 
Scheidegger), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/ 
pubhear/DPSC102506.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
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Nor did it wonder aloud how this state's first twenty-eight death 
sentences could have been so defective that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court reversed each of them. The Commission's 
abolitionist majority would hardly criticize their comrades on 
the Court for subverting the will of the people. Instead the 
Report uses Scheidegger to concede that in New Jersey the 
numbers were too scant and condemnations too rare to 
conclude anything much on behalf of deterrence.s9 
So, although the latest, most recent, most sophisticated 
studies do suggest that on balance, a death penalty regularly 
administered, more effectively deters murder than does life 
without parole, suppose we join the Commission in putting 
these studies aside. 
Assume that collectively without more, the data to this point 
fails to clearly and convincingly prove the death penalty 
operates as a marginally more effective deterrent than life in 
prison. What else could support or supplant this latest but not 
yet conclusive empirical evidence? We're thrown back to human 
nature - "our hunches about how humans behave," which even 
in the light of the attack on deterrence, "remain, for now, 
untouched," testified Professor Lillquist, an agnostic on the 
death penalty.6° 
This "commonsense argument from human nature, 
applicable particularly to certain kinds of murders and certain 
kinds of murderers" strongly suggests that threatened death 
generally deters better than threatened life.61 
"No other punishment deters men so effectually from 
committing crimes as the punishment of death," observed Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, the great 19th century English judge 
and leading historian of the criminal law. 
This is one of those propositions which it is 
difficult to prove, simply because they are in 
themselves more obvious than any proof can make 
them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing 
against it, but that is all. The whole experience of 
mankind is in the other direction . . . 'All that a 
59 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. 
6o COMM'N MEETINGS, supra note 22, at 35. 
6l ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 26, at 19. 
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man has will he give for his life.' In any secondary 
punishment, however terrible, there is hope; [b]ut 
death is death. 62 
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My years interviewing street killers inside maximum security 
prisons and on death rows confirm this, exploding the 
categorical myth that the death penalty never deters more 
effectively than life without parole. My oral testimony informed 
the Committee about "Joe,'' who specialized in robbing drug 
dealers in the D.C. area. While robbing a middle-level dealer in 
his house in Virginia, Joe and his partners discovered to their 
delight in addition to cocaine, their robbery victims also 
possessed kilos of heroin. Joe told his cohort to wait outside 
while he dealt with his victims, already tied up and duct taped. 
Joe had decided to kill them, he recalled. But at the last 
moment he changed his mind. Why had he let them live? 
"When I was doing time in Richmond, I used to see the electric 
chair when I swept the hall. And what flashed in my mind was 
that chair, and I didn't want that. I couldn't handle that. So I let 
them live."63 
This only shows how the death penalty deterred this one 
killer at this one moment. It does not demonstrate the more 
important point that sometimes only the death penalty can 
deter where life in prison will not. But Joe continued, telling me 
of a similar situation in Washington, D.C., which does not have 
the death penalty. "What did you do?" He said matter-of-factly, 
"I killed them. Because I could face life inside this joint. I had 
done time here before, and I knew I could do it again. But that 
chair, man. That's something else."64 
Of course this is but one anecdote - although the most direct 
kind of evidence on deterrence we can ever hope to have. But 
why should we consider it freakish? Other stories in the 
literature and my own interviews confirm it. For most people --
and especially for those who have already served time in prison 
62 Id. at 753 (citing James Fitzjames Stephen, Capital Punishments, 
FRASER'S MAGAZINE, June 1864). 
63 Interview with "Joe," prisoner in the Lorton Central Prison in 
Washington, D.C. 
64Jd. 
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and do not fear repeating that experience - only the threat of 
death, and sometimes not even that, will restrain them. 
This witness drew the Commission's attention to these 
anecdotes, to the British Commission report, a model of fairness 
and depth the Commission could have tried to emulate. He 
drew their attention to Fitzjames Stephen's observations on 
human nature, which the Commission conveniently avoided 
mentioning in its final report, perhaps because these truisms are 
so difficult to rebut. 65 
Instead, moved by Professor Fagan's scholarly critique, the 
Commission dismissed "a sea change in the scholarship on 
deterrence and the death penalty" as Scheiddeger called it, 
where "improved methods of econometrics" by and large 
"confirms what common sense has always told us."66 
How to resolve the conflict among studies, undermined by 
data too sparse statistically to make the case for or against 
deterrence? 
Absent overwhelming statistical proof, it might seem that 
commonsense and human nature would decide this issue. But 
not for this Commission, determined at the outset to abolish the 
death penalty: "Given the plethora of scientific analysis, 
'common-sense' explanations of the penalty's deterrent effect 
based on logic ... are neither persuasive nor important."67 
When should logic, human nature and commonsense count? 
When all the evidence is to the contrary? Or never at all? If not 
here, where empirical studies apparently conflict, when would 
the Commission count logic, human nature and common sense? 
In the end, regardless of the Commission's unsupported 
assertion, commonsense, human nature, logic, and anecdote 
strongly support what the most recent statistical studies suggest 
- death generally deters more effectively than life. 
Deterrence alone, however, should rarely if ever justify death 
as punishment. 
65 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 37. 
66 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 5. 
67 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis added). 
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Retribution 
However repulsive to a majority of the Commission, 68 
retribution remains the primary justification for the death 
penalty, the primary "penological intent." Rejected by most 
professors these past few decades, retribution -- literally "pay 
back" -- persists as punishment's essential justification and 
limit. Retributivists refuse to condemn and execute a helpless 
person simply to terrify others. We retributivists would only 
execute a person who deserves to die. 
Retribution could have split the Commission between 
abolitionists who detested the death penalty and those like 
Commissioner Kathleen Garcia who wanted executions badly 
but despaired that they would ever happen.69 If the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would forever block the death penalty, then why 
force victims' families to have their deep wounds periodically 
picked open by the endless legal process? 
The Commission should have seriously considered whether 
retributive justice ever demands death. Instead, the 
Commission barely acknowledged the retributive lens and never 
employed it, or rebutted those of us who would. But the 
Commission cannot avoid retribution and still fulfill its 
legislated mandate. It cannot avoid retribution and serve the 
public good. 
All seven questions the legislature put to the Commission7° 
really implicate retribution directly or indirectly (metaphorically 
in the case of "costs"). Four of the Commission's eight findings 
involve retribution essentially: 
"(1) There is no compelling evidence that the New Jersey 
death penalty rationally serves a legitimate penological 
intent."71 
68 Id. at 30. 
69 See id.; Id. at 93-96 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death 
Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring). 
7° S. 709, 211th Leg., 32i. (N.J. 2006). 
71 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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"(5) Abolition of the death penalty will eliminate the risk of 
disproportionality in capital sentencing ."72 
"(6) The penological interest in executing a small number of 
persons guilty of murder is not sufficiently compelling to justify 
the risk of making an irreversible mistake."73 
"(7) The alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum 
security institution without the possibility of parole would 
sufficiently ensure public safety and address other legitimate 
social and penological interests, including the interests of the 
families of murder victims."74 
Instead of really focusing on retribution and allowing its 
great weight throughout, however, the Commission report 
handled retribution quickly up front right after deterrence, 
acknowledged an internal split among Commissioners,75 and 
delicately mostly avoided it thereafter. As we'll see, when the 
Commission report reached questions 5, 6, & 7 
disproportionality, the penological interest in executing the 
worst of the worst, and the moral sufficiency of life without 
parole-- they avoided the question of justice. By disallowing 
retribution to act as a counterweight, the Commission could 
assume their conclusions, avoid difficult balancing, and simply 
call for abolition. 
Early witnesses disparaged retributive support for the death 
penalty as vestigial hypocrisy. We "debase and degrade 
ourselves by resorting to the same conduct that we condemn for 
those who kill."76 "Killing because someone else has killed" was 
not "consistent with ... the mores of a civilized society."77 "We 
72Jd. 
73Jd. 
74Jd. 
75 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
76 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 116 (testimony of Dan 
Carluccio). 
77 Id. at 46 (testimony of Robert Del Tufo). 
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cannot teach respect for life by taking life."78 But this well-worn 
argument -- that we debase life by taking life -- if it proves 
anything, proves too much. When we imprison kidnappers, do 
we thereby debase liberty, this witness asked rhetorically, in 
writing and oral testimony before the Commission ?79 When we 
impose fines on thieves, do we debase property? Punishment 
acts as a like kind response - inflicting justified pain upon a 
person who earlier inflicted unjustified pain (so, too, of course 
celebration - returning pleasure for past pleasure). Thus the 
basic retributive measure - like for like - "as he has done, so 
shall it be done to him;"8o "giving a person a taste of her own 
medicine;" "fighting fire with fire" - satisfies at a primal level. 
Reciprocity is not hypocrisy. 
During the hearings, Judge John Gibbons (and other critics) 
disparaged retribution as "atavistic" and a "synonym" for 
"vengeance."81 Apparently our earlier public debate, sponsored 
by the New Jersey League of Women Voters, failed to enlighten 
the former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit, an ardent 
abolitionist, as he once again conflated retribution with 
vengeance or revenge. 
"Those who insist on equating retribution with revenge" this 
witness countered at length in his twenty minutes before the 
Commission, must: 
recognize [deterrence] for what [it] is. Because if 
retribution is pure revenge, then deterrence is 
pure terrorism, as Hobbes - the first and greatest 
modern utilitarian said in disparaging 
retribution and proposing deterrence. He said, 
"The aym of punishment is not revenge, it's 
terror." Now, we've come to appreciate that 
78 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 5 (July 19, 
2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006] available at 
http:/ /www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub /pubhear /DPSC071906. pdf (citing 
Bishop John M. Smith) Oast visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
79 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 35. 
80 Leviticus 24:19. 
Bl COMM'N MEETINGS, supra note 20, at 11. 
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deterrence is not pure terror. You should also 
appreciate that retribution is not pure revenge. 82 
Vol 5:1 
Although they stem from a common desire to inflict pain on 
the source of pain, revenge may be limitless and misdirected at 
the undeserving, as with collective punishment. Retribution, 
however, must be limited and proportional - no more (or less) 
than what's deserved, this witness further protested.83 
"[R]etribution provides the basis for limiting punishment as 
well as for affirming it," he insisted in his oral testimony before 
the Commission. "We, as advocates of the death penalty, are as 
concerned that those who do not deserve it do not get it, as we 
are that those who do, do."84 
The Commission's final report, to its credit, did not repeat 
abolitionists' false equation of retribution and revenge, citing me 
instead and supposedly recounting my rejoinder: 
Professor Blecker stated that retribution should 
not be equated with revenge, which is not 
proportional and is unlimited. Rather, he said, 
retribution is proportional to the crime of murder. 
Retribution is based on the principle of lex 
talionis, or "an eye for an eye" - the belief that 
punishment should fit the crime. 85 
But this retributivist never actually said or implied that 
"retribution is proportional to murder." Literally non-sensical, 
the Commission's restatement badly distorts my position 
repeatedly expressed: Murder only rarely calls for the death 
penalty. Pennsylvania was first explicitly to recognize this in 
1794, splitting off 1st degree capital murder from other murder.86 
And the U.S. Supreme Court has held for decades, the death 
penalty may not be used for the vast majority of murders. 87 
s2 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 36. 
83Jd. at 34. 
84Jd. 
85 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
86 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 336 n.55 (1972) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
87 Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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Death is a wildly disproportionate response for felony murder 
where there is neither an intent to kill nor reckless disregard for 
human life.ss 
The Commission's unfortunate mischaracterization of 
retribution probably unintentionally stemmed from its desire to 
pass retribution by quickly and the Commission's failure to 
grasp this concept so alien to it yet central to the vast majority of 
the American public. 
Let's get the record straight. Revenge may be a potentially 
unlimited disproportional response. Retribution demands a 
proportionate limited response. But at least the Commission 
here seemed to understand that the proportionality question 
could not be answered without considering retribution directly. 
Except when the Commission did specifically arrive at the 
question of proportionality, its report somehow virtually ignored 
retribution. s9 
Abolitionists who reject retribution -- who do not feel the 
urge to punish, or do feel it but suppress that feeling of 
righteous indignation as irrational and shameful -- cannot really 
grasp what moves us retributivists. 
Retribution itself remains a complex doctrine. Retributivists 
split into different camps, disagreeing among themselves about 
the calculus of desert. Immanuel Kant, perhaps the best known 
retributivist, would count only the killer's intent or motive, 
holding that the only pure evil is an evil will. 9o Most 
retributivists, however, also factor in the actual harm willingly 
caused. All other things equal, murder is worse than attempted 
murder, and thus deserves greater punishment. In common, 
retributivists refuse to justify punishment by its future costs or 
benefits, resting justice -- limited, proportional punishment -
exclusively on a criminal's past moral culpability. 
Most retributive death penalty supporters, then, define the 
"worst of the worst" as deserving to die for the extreme harms 
they cause (rape-murder, mass-murder, child- murder, torture-
88 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137 (1987). 
89 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
9o IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 84 (William Hastie trans., Alex 
Catalogue of Electronic Texts) (1790). 
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murder) along with the attitude with which they cause it -
sadistically or with a depraved callousness. 
According to Immanuel Kant's classic retributivism, we 
impose punishment as an abstract duty without any emotion. 
By punishing, we dignify the transgressor, acknowledging the 
free will that produced the crime. The murderer must die; Kant 
insists, "his death, however, must be kept free from all 
maltreatment." Kant rejects offering the condemned an option 
to submit to dangerous medical experiments on condition that 
his life be spared if he survives, insisting that we always treat 
human beings as ends in themselves, and never merely as a 
means to our ends.91 Following Kant's lead, again, 
contemporary retributivists reject general deterrence as an 
insufficient justification for punishment, especially death -
otherwise we would be making an example of a person, in order 
to change others' future behavior. 
More persistent and popular than Kant's retributivism from 
an abstract sense of duty, emotive/intuitive retributivism has 
deeper roots. 
Abolitionists in the hearings consistently disparaged 
emotion: "We know that the death penalty is mostly an 
emotional response to heinous acts,''92 and "[a]n emotional 
response not based on reason."93 Although we may try to avoid 
it, however, emotion has always played a vital part in moving us 
to respond correctly. 
"The voice of your brother's blood cries out to me from the 
ground,'' Genesis proclaims. 94 In other words, blood pollutes 
the land. Like the ancient Greeks and ancient Hebrews, 
contemporary emotive retributivists feel polluted if vicious 
murderers walk free, or frolic in confinement, failing to get their 
just deserts. 
Abolitionist critics of retribution insisted at the hearings that 
emotion may never properly move us individually or 
collectively: 
91Jd. 
92 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 112-13. 
93Jd. 
94 Genesis 4:10. 
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My heart goes out to every family devastated by 
the murder of a loved one. They have every right 
to be angry and to express that anger. But I'm 
certain that deep down not one of them would 
want to act out of that anger. As a society, we 
should not act out of anger either,95 
Senator Lesniak flatly asserted. 
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Emotive retributivists' urge to punish, however, stems 
directly from a projected empathy with the victim's suffering. 
"Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his grief," declared 
Adam Smith in A Theory of Moral Sentiments, the first great 
work of modern retributive psychology, "so is it likewise 
animated with that spirit ... to drive away or destroy the cause of 
it."96 Haunted by the victim's suffering, retributive death 
penalty supporters cannot forget or forgive the victim's fate: 
"We feel that resentment which we imagine he ought to feel, and 
which he would feel if in his cold and lifeless body there 
remained any consciousness of what passes upon earth," Smith 
further explained.97 "His blood ... calls aloud".98 
Embracing human dignity as our primary value, emotive 
retributivists since Adam Smith emphasize "a humanity that is 
more generous and comprehensive," "oppos[ing] to the 
emotions of compassion which [we] feel for a particular person, 
a more enlarged compassion which [we] feel for mankind."99 
This witness urged these feelings upon the Commission in 
writing and oral testimony.100 The Commission report, however 
completely ignored emotive retributivism, instead drawing 
summarily upon the testimony of Professor Lillquist, a 
professed agnostic on the death penalty: "The retributivist 
viewpoint is in accordance with the philosophy of Immanuel 
9sid. at 6. 
96 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 98-99 (Augustus M. 
Kelley 1966) (1759). 
97 Id. 
98Id. 
99 Id. at 128. 
100 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 34, 36. 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
Kant that, for the most heinous forms of wrongdoing, the 
penalty of death is morally justified or perhaps even 
required. "101 
Treating retributivism as a monolith - as duty stripped of 
emotion -- allowed the Commission to expropriate emotion 
when useful. Thus the Commission could express its 
understanding and sympathy for victims' families who had 
allowed their own fury at their loved ones' killers to get the best 
of them. And the Commission could display sensitivity to and 
solidarity with the emotional rollercoaster ride a death penalty 
never actually administered forced upon the victims' families, by 
calling for the abolition of the only hope these families had of 
ever seeing justice done. 
Up front before they buried it, the Commission's final report 
treated retribution - poison to some of the commissioners -
respectfully if gingerly, declining to repeat witnesses' silly, 
specious claims of retributive hypocrisy, or the misleading 
equation of retribution with vengeance.102 Instead here, and 
only in this part, did the report quote me. "In the words of 
Professor Blecker: 'Naturally grateful, we reward those who 
bring us pleasure. Instinctively resentful, we punish those who 
cause us pain. Retributively, society intentionally inflicts pain 
and suffering on criminals because and to the extent that they 
deserve it. But only to the extent they deserve it ... Justice, a 
moral imperative in itself, requires deserved punishment'."103 
101 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29. 
102 See, e.g., Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 112 (testimony 
of Dan Carluccio). 
103 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. 
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WHOSE BURDEN? 
By its cleverly worded first finding - "there is no compelling 
evidence that the New Jersey death penalty rationally serves a 
legitimate penological intent"104 - the Commission effectively 
shifted the burden of persuasion upon those who would retain 
the present statute rather than upon those who would change 
the law. 
The burden, however, should be on those who insist that the 
death penalty always undermines the retributive goal of justice. 
If the Commission had really faced the retributive question, and 
placed the burden where it should lie, abolitionists on the 
Commission would have felt called upon to establish that life 
without parole and not death gives the most heinous killers 
their just deserts. Instead, rejecting retribution as repulsive and 
the death penalty as immoral, the Commission majority simply 
begged the question and shifted the burden.10s 
Suppose the obvious: Retributively, death is not always a 
grossly disproportionate response. Complex questions remain. 
Does death and death alone uniquely qualify as justice? And 
even then, where death is the only just punishment, do practical 
concerns of efficiency and policy trump retributive justice? The 
Commission should have focused upon these questions in its 
later findings. Instead, the Commission cleverly phrased its first 
finding to place the burden of persuasion on those who insist 
that justice sometimes demands death. So we have the burden, 
yet the Commission excludes most of our case. 
And what a strange burden the Commission imposes upon 
us. We would shoulder it. "Compelling evidence" - evidence 
which compels us to demand the death penalty: "The voice of 
our brother's blood;"106 "like members of the same body, [we] 
104 Id. at 1. 
105Jd. 
106 Genesis 4:10. 
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should feel and resent each other's injuries;"107 "it [is] highly 
desirable that criminals should be hated."108 
It is ironic, if not hypocritical, for the Commission to impose 
this "compelling" emotional burden upon retributive death 
penalty advocates while allowing retribution, if at all, only as 
strictly rational and non-emotive. 
How could Commission members, never so much as 
acknowledging emotive retributivism which does distinguish 
emotion from abstract duty, ever be "compelled" by it? 
Contemporary utilitarians declare it irrational to cry over spilt 
blood. Punishment for the sake of the past seems pointless to 
them - "what good will it do to inflict more pain?" Of course we 
retributivists reply that Justice, a moral imperative in itself, 
requires deserved punishment. Again, emotive retributivists, in 
fact all retributivists, draw from the non-rational but real 
feeling that the past counts, separately from future costs and 
benefits. 
How could Commissioners who do not feel the intuitive urge 
to punish appropriately - for whom the past does not count as a 
covenant to be kept - who simply reject from the outset 
retribution as "a legitimate penological intent" - and give 
intuitive emotion no weight - ever feel "compelled" by it? 
Thus the Commission majority completely ignored centuries 
of traditional retributivism. The Commission ignored the 
current resurgence of retributive thought in the academy and 
among the people. Perhaps least defensible of all, the 
Commission completely ignored the apparent future dominance 
of retributivism in the 21st century. 
Explicitly incorporating retribution as punishment's primary 
justification, the proposed new Model Penal Code declares: 
"Under the new scheme, no utilitarian or restorative purpose of 
sentencing may justify a punishment outside the range of 
severity proportionate to the gravity of the offense, the harm to 
107 Attributed to Solon, the ancient Greek law giver. See ROBERT J. BONNER, 
LAWYERS AND LmGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 60 (1927). 
108 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
81-2 (Macmillan 1883)). 
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the crime victim, and the blameworthiness of the offender."109 
Thus, the new Model Penal Code instructs legislatures to consult 
their own moral judgment and apply their own intuitions of 
desert to design punishments within the retributive range.110 
Instead of discussing whether retribution, alone, outweighed 
the other justifications for the death penalty combined, the 
Commission briefly acknowledged themselves "divided about 
whether retribution is an appropriate penological intent," worth 
counting at all! 111 
So by its first finding, this anti-retributivist New Jersey 
Death Penalty Commission majority cleverly imposed an 
impossibly burdensome standard - "compelling evidence that 
death rationally serves a legitimate penological intent" -
retribution ultimately excluded, emotive retribution completely 
ignored.112 
FINDING (2) THE COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ARE 
GREATER THAN THE COSTS OF LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT 
PAROLE, BUT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEASURE THESE COSTS 
WITH ANY DEGREE OF PRECISION. 113 
Financial costs of the death penalty 
"A precise conclusion cannot be reached," the Commission 
Report stated up front. Yet the report did specify the death 
penalty's enhanced costs from investigation to appeal. The 
Public Defender's office estimated that abolishing capital 
punishment would save almost $i.5 million per year.114 The 
Department of Corrections estimated that eliminating the death 
109 Model Penal Code § i.02(2)(a)(i) cmt. a at 16 (Discussion Draft April 17, 
2006) (emphasis added). 
110 Id. 
111 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. 
112 Id. at 1. 
113 Id. at 3i. 
114 Id. at 31. 
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penalty would save the state approximately $1 million per death 
row prisoner over each inmate's lifetime.ns The Administrative 
Office of the Courts (AOC) estimated $100,000 extra for each 
mandated death penalty proportionality review on appeal.116 
The Commission did note in passing that the AOC was unable to 
compare death penalty trial costs with non-death penalty 
murder trial costs, because "many different variables in murder 
trials preclude such a comparison. These variables include the 
possibility of plea bargaining (which would negate the need for a 
trial altogether)."117 
The vast majority of criminal cases result in plea bargains 
which not only save time, effort, and costs of trial and appeal, 
but also protect against an unpredictable and errant jury 
ignoring the evidence and acquitting a sympathetic accused. In 
return for pleading guilty, criminals almost always receive lesser 
charges or lighter sentences. 
Without a death penalty as a threat, what would move an 
aggravated murderer to waive trial and appeal, and accept life 
without parole? Perhaps, in a rare case, remorse. 
Overwhelmingly, however, first degree murderers plead guilty 
and accept life without parole only to avoid the death penalty. 
Each such guilty plea saves the people hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. 
The abolitionist Defense bar could hardly be counted upon to 
subtract public money saved by guilty pleas extracted under fear 
of death. The Attorney General had noted this huge potential 
cost saving from capital punishment, and the Commission did 
quote them: "Those defendants who are currently death-eligible 
would still face the possibility of life without parole or, at 
minimum, a very lengthy sentence, so a protracted trial to 
determine guilt would still be necessary."11s Abolish the death 
penalty and predictably there will be more murder trials and 
many fewer pleas of guilt with life sentences. 
11s Id. at 32. The Department of Corrections gave a range of $937,430 to 
$1,229,240. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
l18 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
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Nobody attached a hard number here like $g3,ooo or $1.2 
million. Instead the Commission cleverly further softened these 
enormous savings from a death penalty: "The Commission 
notes that estimating the cost to the prosecutors is difficult 
because the issue involves resource allocation. In other words, 
if prosecutors are no longer involved with a lengthy death 
penalty case because the death penalty has been eliminated, 
they will expend their efforts on other types of prosecutions and 
there will not be measurable cost savings."119 
But then why is this not also true of the defense? Both 
offices, understaffed, would shift personnel. The criminal 
justice system, whether prosecution or defense, routinely 
generates more work to be done than resources to do it. If 
public defenders weren't doing death penalty trials and 
investigations, wouldn't they too shift their attention to other 
under attended cases, thus eliminating cost savings from 
abolition? Why the Commission's asymmetry? After giving 
hard numbers to the extra costs of the death penalty, and 
softening the extra savings from it, the Commission reiterated 
the many immeasurable "cost savings ... from eliminating the 
death penalty."120 But this double counting should not obscure 
that extra costs from having a death penalty are the same as cost 
savings from eliminating it. 
"The Commission notes that ... recent studies in states such 
as Tennessee, Kansas, Indiana, Florida and North Carolina have 
all concluded that the costs associated with death penalty cases 
are significantly higher than those associated with life without 
parole cases. These studies can be accessed through the Death 
Penalty Information Center."121 
Access them. What do we find? While recent studies seem 
to show that it does cost more to maintain the death penalty 
than life without parole in an individual case, these studies omit 
the enormous cost saving for each guilty plea and life sentence 
the murderer accepts in order to avoid the death penalty. 
119 Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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"That has never been subtracted by any study," this witness 
informed the Commission orally and in writing.122 Only Kansas, 
which the Commission mentions without investigation, 
specifically acknowledged their own omission, albeit in a 
footnote. 123 Once included in the assessment, "it may turn out 
that the cost figures come out differently, that it's in fact cheaper 
to execute than it is to maintain life without parole," this witness 
suggested to the Commission.124 And "even if it's more 
expensive ... justice isn't cheap. And if the death penalty is the 
only just alternative then we have to do it even though it may be 
expensive. "12s 
"The Commission wishes to stress the fact that, although it is 
not possible to measure many of the cost savings that would 
result from eliminating the death penalty, these savings 
nonetheless exist."126 Repeat it enough and it seems to gain 
weight. 
The Commission, of course, entirely ignored costs of not 
doing justice -- a retributive question cloaked as a financial one. 
Can we blame Commissioners for ignoring this "cost" when they 
do not see the death penalty as the only just result? Should we 
criticize the Commission for avoiding the costs of not doing 
justice, and all other controversial non-financial, immeasurable 
almost metaphorical costs from its calculus? Arguably in its 
straightforward second "finding," the Commission should avoid 
philosophy and stick to finance: "The costs of the death penalty 
are greater than the costs of life in prison without parole, but it 
is not possible to measure these costs with any degree of 
precision. "127 
122 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 41 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
123 Legislative Division of Post Audit, State of Kansas, Costs Incurred for 
Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit of the Department of Corrections 19 
(2003). 
124 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 41 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
125 Id. 
126 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. 
127 Id. at i. 
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Fair enough. Avoid emotional costs entirely. Except behold! 
- as the Commission's "cost" analysis continued. 
Emotional and psychological costs of the death 
penalty 
"The Commission heard from a number of family members 
of murder victims about the devastating emotional costs of the 
death penalty. Survivors testified to the pain of being forced to 
relive the trauma of their loved ones' murders during prolonged 
appeals."12s Victims' families talked of the frustration of 
wanting and waiting for their loved ones' killers to die. Much of 
the victims' family bitterness and frustration came from the 
false promise of justice. The system would never deliver on its 
promise - endless stays and reversals from a state supreme 
court that would not allow an execution. 
"A psychologist . . . testified about the adverse effects of 
executions on . . . judges, jurors . . . correctional staff, 
journalists, clergy and spiritual advisors, as well as the families 
of the . . . condemned . . . . The Commission finds that these 
intangible emotional and psychological costs must also be 
taken into consideration in weighing the costs of the death 
penalty."129 
So, non-quantifiable emotional costs do count. Then how 
about the cost of not doing justice? In some cases, abolishing 
the death penalty -- retributively, the only proportional 
punishment - abolishes justice. Yet even the minority of 
Commissioners such as Kathleen Garcia, while bitterly 
denouncing life-without-parole as inadequate for vicious killers 
who deserve to die, refused to see justice not done as an added 
cost, since no murderer in New Jersey was being executed 
anyway. Steeped in the reality of victims' families suffering from 
false promise, she voted to eliminate any hope of doing justice, 
because of the current abolitionist mood on the state high 
court.13° 
12s Id. at 33. 
129 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
13° Id. at 93-96. 
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How about the cost to parents who realize their child's rapist 
murderer now lives in prison playing basketball or watching the 
New Jersey Nets play on a color TV? What does it cost to 
contemplate the person who tortured your child to death now 
lying on a prison bed, lost in a first run movie or good book? 
A voiding emotive retributivism, the Commission report 
completely ignores all emotional costs of not doing justice. 
FINDING (3): THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEATH PENALTY IS INCONSISTENT WITH EVOLVING 
STANDARDS OF DECENCY.131 
That mantra of the modern era: "Evolving standards of 
decency of a maturing society." Suppose we all subscribe to the 
U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement: The meaning of the 8th 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment is informed 
by "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society."132 
Does it offend our maturing sense of dignity and decency to 
put to death the worst of our murderers? Does this boil down to 
a public opinion poll, rightly conducted? Can the public's sense 
of decency sometimes regress, or recede rather than mature? 
Two very different viewpoints frame this great debate: All 
absolutists - whether they are retributivists unalterably 
committed to punishing with death all (but only) those who 
deserve it, or abolitionists unalterably committed to eradicating 
the death penalty - know intuitively and feel certain there is one 
right, "mature" answer to this great question - "is death ever 
justified punishment?" 
Relativists or Utilitarians, on the other hand, would settle the 
question of capital punishment by comparing its costs and 
benefits, assessing its effectiveness as a crime control measure, 
while always taking into account public opinion and particular 
social context: Does death incapacitate the condemned and 
deter other would-be killers more cheaply and efficiently than 
life imprisonment without parole? If so, let's have it; if not, let's 
not. 
131 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 35. 
132 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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Since Plato battled the sophists in the 5th century B.C., 
Western Culture's ancient traditions include the controversy 
over truth. The sophists denied objective truth; everything was 
opinion and appearance. Truth, justice, was whatever a person 
or society could be persuaded to act upon. Using the wisdom of 
Heraclitus that "you could not step in the same river twice," 
today's sophist-abolitionists look upon "evolving standards" as 
strictly a matter of public perception or opinion. There would be 
no moral fact of the matter. Evolving standards of a maturing 
society would amount to little more than potentially fluctuating 
public opinion. The prevailing tastes of today - the present -
govern. 
Moral facts, however, move us absolutists. 
Whether strongly supporting or opposing the death penalty, 
in common absolutists reject today's public opinion as the 
arbiter of death's decency or indecency. Absolutist abolitionists 
feel certain that society violates human dignity when under 
cover of law we methodically kill fellow human beings who pose 
no imminent threat to us. Absolutist proponents, on the other 
hand, also feel certain - unfortunately and undeniably - that 
this very nasty world contains predatory, vicious people who 
engage in behavior so despicable and destructive, with an 
attitude so cruel or callous, that they deserve to die. Obliged to 
do justice, Society must execute them. By killing these vicious 
killers for their cruelty, we acknowledge their responsibility -
and thereby whatever little humanity remains. 
So, we absolutists - abolitionists and retributivists alike -
embrace human dignity as our ultimate issue. We reject any 
suggestion that the death penalty's decency or indecency 
ultimately rests on shifting public opinion. 
Absolutist opponents of capital punishment, however, 
happily make sophistic common cause with their utilitarian 
brethren: Public rejection alone, however temporary, should 
permanently Constitutionally damn the death penalty, they 
insist, while public support alone, however robust, can never 
make it Constitutional, even for a moment. 
Let's follow the Commission, into a relativist, subjective 
world of "evolving standards" and public opinion. During the 
hearings witnesses insisted on the "growing national consensus 
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for abolition of the death penalty."133 A professional pollster, 
Patrick Murray, testified that although a clear majority of those 
polled maintains an abstract preference for the death penalty, 
when given the alternative punishment of life without parole as 
an option, at least in New Jersey, more people prefer it to 
death. 134 
But carefully consider a standard poll question: "Which 
punishment do you prefer for people convicted of murder: the 
death penalty or life in prison with no chance of parole." Note 
the fallacy of that standard question? How it doubly distorts. 
First, 'for people convicted of murder' or Gallup's "which is the 
better penalty for murder?"13s Discriminating, informed, 
retributivist advocates would reserve the death penalty only for 
aggravated murder - the "worst of the worst." Suppose we 
recognize, along with the U.S. Supreme Court and every death 
penalty jurisdiction in the U.S. that the vast majority of 
murderers do not deserve to die?136 How should we answer this 
question? Do we "prefer" death or life without parole ''for cases 
of murder"? 
Real retributivists oppose the death penalty for most "cases 
of murder." Only for the most despicable murderers do we favor 
it. Should we answer "life" and allow their poll to count us as 
abolitionists? 
133 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 49 (testimony of Edith 
Frank). 
134 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 68 (testimony of Patrick 
Murray). 
135 QUINNIPIAC UNNERSITY POLLING INSTITUTE, NEW JERSEY VOTERS AREN'T 
BANKING ON PROPERTY TAX CUTS, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL FINDS; DON'T 
SELL THE TuRNPIKE, VOTERS SAY, Jan. 24, 2007 at #34, available at 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaselD=1006 Oast visited Nov. 8, 
2007) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Carroll, Joseph, Americans and the Death 
Penalty, GALLUP, Dec. 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14371/ Americans-Death-Penalty.aspx Oast visited 
Nov. 7, 2007). 
136 See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and N.Y. PENAL LAw 
§ 125.27 (McKinney 2003). 
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Secondly, consider the last part of the question: "with no 
chance of parole"137 or Gallup's "with absolutely no possibility 
of parole."138 Abolitionists delight in emphasizing that we who 
sometimes favor death cannot be "absolutely certain" an 
innocent person will never be executed - and thus we should 
abolish the penalty rather than take infinitesimal if inescapable 
risks. Yet the very same opponents who would disable us from 
acting on near-certainty, blithely assure their fellow citizens that 
life without parole carries "no chance" of parole. 
Most citizens will equate "absolutely no possibility of parole" 
with "no possibility of release." Few people would factor in 
executive clemency. And, while a parole board may almost 
never release a convicted mass murderer, even after he has aged 
and now seems gentle and no longer any threat to anyone, a 
future legislature may simply abolish life without parole 
altogether and apply it retroactively. Europe does not have life 
without parole, although you'd be hard pressed to know this 
from leading media news outlets whose editorials otherwise 
urge us to follow Europe's lead.139 
Although by written statement and live testimony, this 
witness warned the Commission of these distortions, the 
Commission report simply ignored these warnings. 14° 
The standard poll question further distorts and artificially 
diminishes support for the death penalty by making the 
aggravated murder itself little more than an abstract event. 
Polls discourage respondents from matching a concrete 
punishment to a specific crime. Of course abolitionist pollsters 
shy away from asking even the abstract question directly: 'Do 
you favor the death penalty for the worst murderers - for 
example a serial killer who rapes and tortures children?' Once 
made aware of the victim's suffering and the killer's viciousness, 
what punishment will the overwhelming majority match to 
l37 QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLLING INSTITUTE, supra note 135 (emphasis 
added). 
138 Americans and the Death Penalty, supra note 135 (emphasis added). 
139 See, e.g., Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 48 (testimony of 
Robert Blecker). 
14° See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1. 
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torturing and killing children? That question - do you favor the 
death penalty for the worst murderers? - the real question -
abolitionist pollsters and the Commission must avoid. 
During the hearings, two commissioners picked up on 
distorted polling and pressed Patrick Murray, the pollster. 
Commissioner DeFazio asked: "Do you realize that when the 
more specific questions are asked, and when I say 'more 
specific,' I mean fact sensitive questions are asked .... you would 
agree with me if the question was asked, 'Would you support the 
death penalty for Timothy McVeigh?' the percentage would rise 
astronomically?"141 
"Yes,''142 Murray replied. Commissioner DeFazio followed 
up: "underlying all of this is the theory that the punishment 
should fit the specific crime."143 
Commissioner Moczula also inquired about the polling 
process, asking: "You did not ask in these polls, 'Do you favor 
the death penalty were it limited to particularly heinous or 
extraordinary murders?'; it was a general question on favoring 
the death penalty."144 The pollster conceded. "That's correct. 
None of the polls ... in New Jersey had asked that question."14s 
And the Commissioner pressed again: "Did you ask the 
question, 'Do you favor the death penalty versus life without 
parole, but with the possibility of executive clemency?"'146 
"No, we did not ask that question,'' Murray admitted.147 
Ironic, then, how the same pollsters who claimed that 
theoretical or abstract support for the death penalty 
substantially diminishes when concrete alternatives of life 
141 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 77 (testimony of Edward 
J. DeFazio, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
142 Id. (testimony of Patrick Murray). 
143 Id. at 79 (testimony of Edward J. DeFazio, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty 
Study Comm'n). 
144 Id. at 85 (testimony of Boris Moczula). 
145 Id. at 85 (testimony of Patrick Murray). 
146 Id. at 85 (testimony of Boris Moczula). 
147 Id. at 85-86 (testimony Patrick Murray). 
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without parole are presented - make certain to keep the crime 
itself abstract, and also imply falsely in their question that the 
alternative of life without parole is certain and most severe. As 
we'll see, the Commission did orchestrate witnesses to rebut any 
suggestion that considering the crime and its punishment 
concretely, an "informed citizenry" would overwhelmingly reject 
life without parole in favor of death. 
But in its third finding, the Commission majority avoided 
deep questions of whether public opinion necessarily matures. 
It ignored serious flaws in polling regimes. And it obscured 
concrete details of both crime and punishment, determined to 
find death indecent but unwilling to express its abolitionist 
absolutism lest it lose the votes of death penalty advocates on 
the Commission, thoroughly disgusted and worn out by long 
delays. 
So, instead, the Commission majority artfully managed its 
conclusion, finding "increasing evidence that the death penalty 
is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency."14s 
"Increasing evidence." What a burden of persuasion they 
would place upon themselves! 
The death penalty was used less these days, the Commission 
noted, which of course could mean that prosecutors and juries 
were getting more discriminating in seeking death and imposing 
it, decently reserving the ultimate sanction for the ultimate 
crime. The Commission pointed, among other things, to a 2000 
Quinnipiac poll which "found that only 40% of State residents 
believed that the death penalty deters other potential 
murderers.''149 This statement is either completely irrelevant to 
the question of decency, or if it is relevant cuts just the wrong 
way. The polls consistently indicate an overwhelming public 
support for the death penalty based upon just deserts, and in 
spite of a (mis)perceived failure to deter. 
Persistent retributive support for the penalty shows that 
supporters feel certain that sometimes death provides the only 
decent response. 
The Commission report noted the "number of witnesses from 
the religious community" who "uniformly urged abolishing the 
l48 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 35. 
149 Id. at 36. 
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death penalty."15° Apparently specially counting beliefs of 
religious leaders in a secular society did not bother the 
Commission. Nor did the Commission refer to the embarrassing 
fact that while ordinary Americans generally affiliate religiously, 
they often split with the religious elites over this issue. 
Noting "an emerging national consensus against executing 
certain defendants convicted of murder,'' the Commission 
somehow found support in United States Supreme Court 
opinions for increasing evidence of indecency.151 They pointed 
to high Court decisions striking down the death penalty for a 
robbery getaway driver who did not kill or intend anyone be 
killed,152 a rapist of an adult woman who did not otherwise 
injure his victim,153 juveniles who killed,154 and mentally 
retarded murderers.155 
This witness had cited those very same Court opinions to the 
Commission, as evidence that the Supreme Court employed 
retributive thinking to limit punishment it found objectively 
disproportionately severe.156 Citing recent legislation 
nationwide, the Supreme Court Justices had buttressed their 
own moral judgments of disproportionality by pointing to an 
emerging consensus against executing these relatively 
sympathetic defendants. These Court decisions, and the 
supposed emerging consensus which buttressed them, however, 
had nothing to do with the public attitude or moral fact of 
proportionality of death for the worst of the worst. 
Even the Commission had to acknowledge this: "Although 
the Commission recognizes that similarly strong evidence of a 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 37. 
152 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
153 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
154 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
155 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
156 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 34-35 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
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consensus against the death penalty in general has not yet 
emerged, there are suggestions of such a trend."157 
"Suggestions of a trend" - another lightweight burden these 
abolitionist Commissioners placed upon themselves. 
Determined to find "increasing evidence" of "inconsistency" and 
"suggestions of a trend," the Commission relied on isolated 
instances of opposition, starting with the infamous Governor 
George Ryan, convicted felon, emptying Illinois' death row. 158 
Their "evidence" of a trend continued: "New York's death 
penalty statute (enacted in 1995) was struck down by that state's 
Court of Appeals in 2004 and the New York legislature has thus 
far failed to act to reinstate it."159 Of course the Commission 
conveniently failed to mention that the Court struck down the 
statute by a single vote, 4-3, basing its decision not at all upon 
"evolving standards of decency" but solely on the unique and 
uncommonly stupid unrelated "jury deadlock" provision.16° 
Their evidence continued: "In the past two years legislation 
to abolish the death penalty has been introduced in the 
legislatures of 10 states: Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee and 
Washington."161 
So, they would locate support for finding the death penalty 
constitutionally indecent in the failure of one state to reinstate a 
death penalty judicially struck down by a bitterly divided court 
on other grounds, and in legislation introduced (sometimes by a 
single legislator). The Commission saw a national decline in 
death penalties meted out as further evidence of rejection, 
rather than prosecutors' and juries' greater care and moral 
discrimination. And bootstrapping, they Commission also 
mentioned moratoria such as New Jersey's own, as evidence of 
rejection rather than a pause to study the issue. 
157 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
15s Id. 
159 Id. (referencing People v. La Valle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (N.Y. 2004)). 
16° People v. La Valle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (N.Y. 2004). 
161 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 (emphasis added). 
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Of course the Commission once again conveniently omitted 
all counter-evidence. 
In Massachusetts, a long-standing abolitionist state, a 
unanimous jury of 12 had recently decided death in a federal 
prosecution.162 Nor did they mention the recent referendum in 
Wisconsin, another state without the penalty for more than a 
century, where 56% of the people voted to reinstate it.163 This 
official state referendum - this great poll - undermined the 
Commission's conclusion, so the Commission ignored it. 
As it turned out, had the Commission's report come out later, 
it could have pointed to serious efforts to repeal the death 
penalty in several legislatures which passed at least one house, 
or made it out of committee but were thereafter defeated. On 
the other hand a unanimous federal jury gave the death penalty 
to a cop killer in New York;164 South Dakota executed its first 
condemned in 60 years; 16s and several state legislatures 
expanded death eligibles to include rapists of children who did 
not kill their young victims. 166 A Wisconsin legislator 
introduced legislation to restore capital punishment,167 New 
162 United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004). 
163 See Capital Punishment: On Pain of Death, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 
SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 2006, at 18, available at 2006 WLNR 23486756. See also 
Vikas Bajaj et al., THE 2006 ELECTIONS: STATE BY STATE; Midwest, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html 
?res=9Do3E1D61E3FF93AA;35752C1A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted 
=all. 
164 Michael Brick, Jury Agrees on Death Sentence for the Killer of Two 
Detectives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/ 2007 / 01/ 31/nyregion/ 31death.html?n= Top /Reference/Times%20Topics/Peo 
ple/B /Brick, %20Michael. 
165 Monica Davey, Execution in South Dakota, Delayed a Year by Debate 
on Method, Is First in 6 Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, available at 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2007/07/13/us/ 13execute.html?n =Top /Reference/T 
imes%20Topics/People/D /Davey, %2oMonica. 
166 See State v. Kennedy, 957 so.2d 757, 780 (La. 2007). 
167 WISCONSIN: Sen. Lasee Introduces Bill Regarding Death Penalty, U.S. 
FEDERAL NEWS, Apr. 10, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 6803854. 
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York's senate re-enacted a capital statute.168 And perhaps most 
significantly, in New Jersey itself, the Quinnipiac poll showed a 
substantial majority of citizens opposed the Commission's own 
recommendation to abolish the death penalty! 169 
But without such evidence and ignoring what bad news it 
had, the Commission simply imposed a featherweight burden on 
itself and blithely announced its finding. 
FINDING (4) THE AVAILABLE DATA DO NOT SUPPORT A 
FINDING OF INVIDIOUS RACIAL BIAS IN THE APPLICATION OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW JERSEY. 
Judge Baime's annual studies showing no racial bias in the 
administration of the death penalty in New Jersey effectively 
took race out of the Commission's arsenal, and thus largely 
eliminated the issue from this discussion. 17° 
To avoid moral disproportionality, based on class and 
correlated with race, this witness urged the Commission to 
modify the state statute, rejecting a drug-dealing aggravator, 
and abolish capital robbery felony murder.171 Keeping these 
morally irrelevant aggravators in a world where underprivileged 
inner city youths regularly commit economically motivated 
crimes guarantees that blacks and other minorities will be 
disproportionately death eligible. A deadly ethos governs the 
drug trade, directed within at thieves, robbers and business 
rivals. The robbery-murder and drug aggravator virtually 
guarantee that the inner city poor will disproportionately show 
up among the condemned. 
1 68 Al Baker, Republicans Seek a Bipartisan Vote on a Bill to Reinstate the 
State's Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, available at 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2005/ 03/ 02/nyregion/ 02death.html. 
169 QUINNIPIAC UNNERSITY POLLING INSTITUTE, NEW JERSEY VOTERS AREN'T 
BANKING ON PROPERTY TAX CUTS, QUINNIPIAC UNNERSITY POLL FINDS; DON'T 
SELL THE TuRNPIKE, VOTERS SAY, Jan. 24, 2007 at #34, available at 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaselD=1006 Oast visited Nov. 8, 
2007). 
17° COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 41 (2007). 
171 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 57-58 (statement of Robert 
Blecker). 
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Bent on simply abolishing death as punishment, the 
Commission was in no mood to consider how to redefine capital 
crimes so as to radically reduce whatever race effect remained. 
Instead, the Commission ignored this race effect in defining 
capital crimes, and moved past the issue quickly.172 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS 5-7 
From different angles, although rarely explicitly, the 
Commission's findings Five, Six, and Seven return us to the 
original question - not public perception, not costs and benefits 
- but justice, really the primary penological justification for any 
punishment. 
The Commission almost never used the word "justice" in its 
report. Explicitly considering the justice of retaining or 
abolishing capital punishment would have forced it to address 
whether some murderers deserve to die. This would have split 
Commissioners, dividing those who desperately desired that 
vicious killers die, if only the courts would allow us to kill them, 
from the majority of Commissioners who, not feeling retributive 
anger, either rejected retribution entirely, or thought retribution 
could be satisfied without death. 
But the Commission's three findings from overlapping 
perspectives did really focus in upon justice: 
(5) Abolition of the death penalty will eliminate the 
risk of disproportionality in capital sentencing. 
( 6) The penological interest in executing a small 
number of persons guilty of murder is not sufficiently 
compelling to justify the risk of making an irreversible 
mistake. 
(7) The alternative of life imprisonment in a 
maximum security institution without the possibility of 
parole would sufficiently ensure public safety and 
address other legitimate social and penological 
interests, including the interests of the families of 
murder victims. 
172 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. 
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FINDING (5) ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY WILL 
ELIMINATE THE RISK OF DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CAPITAL 
SENTENCING. 173 
Proportionality 
Western culture at its core embraces proportionality. This 
most deeply held common value - that punishment must fit the 
crime - continues to dominate contemporary U.S. Supreme 
Court death penalty jurisprudence.174 
For twenty-five hundred years, proportionality has acted as a 
deep constraint and sacred duty in meting out punishment. 
Originally, like-for-like, "an eye for an eye," exact 1:1 reciprocity 
supplied the simplest and most obvious measure of 
proportionality. But justice required less symmetric measures 
for some crimes, and some criminals: "If the guilty man 
deserves to be beaten," Deuteronomy declares, "the judge shall 
cause him to lie down and be beaten with a number of stripes in 
proportion to his offense,"17s or in another translation, 
"according to the measure of his wickedness". 176 The Magna 
Carta (1215) continued our commitment to proportional 
punishment: "A free man shall be amerced for a small fault only 
according to the measure thereof, and for a great crime 
according to its magnitude."177 
The European Enlightenment embraced liberty and 
rationality. Instead of beating a person in proportion to the 
offense, the new punitive proportionality consisted in depriving 
the criminal of units of freedom. Thus, as Foucault described it, 
"the pain of the body itself is no longer the constituent element 
173 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. 
174 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957 (1991); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
175 Deuteronomy 25:2 (English Standard) (emphasis added). 
176 Deuteronomy 25:2 (Darby). 
m MAGNA CARTA §20 (1215) (England) reprinted in A.E. Dick Howard, 
Magna Carta Text and Commentary 40 (1978). 
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of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations 
punishment has become an economy of suspended rights."178 
The infant American Republic embraced this rational 
proportionality by building penitentiaries and substituting 
prison time for bodily punishment. 
Although several early state constitutions specifically 
included proportionality principles - "All penalties ought to be 
proportioned to the nature of the offence," declared New 
Hampshire's in 1784179 - the U.S. Constitution nowhere 
explicitly commands proportional punishment. The 8th 
Amendment, however, seems to imply it, by prohibiting 
"excessive bail", "excessive fines", and "Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment." 
In 1892, declaring the 8th Amendment was "directed ... 
against all punishments which by their excessive length or 
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged", 
Justice Field, dissenting, would have prohibited Vermont from 
sentencing a seller of unlicensed liquor to 54 years at hard 
labor.18° Such a harsh punishment, "six times as great as any 
court in Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter" and 
"appropriate only for felonies of an atrocious nature", was 
"greatly disproportioned to the offense," and therefore "unusual 
and cruel."181 
A hundred years later, in a leading case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed Michigan's right to mandate life without parole 
for simple possession of a little more than a pound of cocaine. 
"The Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality 
guarantee," insisted Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.182 Justice Scalia later noted that "there is no 
objective standard of gravity."183 These two Justices saw 
l78 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 11 (Alan Sheridan trans., 
Vintage Books 1979) (1977). 
179 N.H. CONST. art. 18 (1784). 
180 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (emphasis added). 
181 Id. at 339, 364. 
182 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965. 
183 Id. at 988. 
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'proportionality' as a pretext for their colleagues to impose their 
own "subjective values". 
But the other Justices disagreed. "[C]ourts have not baldly 
substituted their own subjective moral values for those of the 
legislature," countered Justice White, joined by Blackmun and 
Stevens, dissenting in Harmelin. 184 Michigan, with no death 
penalty, could not constitutionally reserve the same punishment 
for drug possession as it had for first degree murder. 
Justice Kennedy, joined by O'Connor and Souter, upheld 
Harmelin's life sentence but occupied the current Constitutional 
middle ground: "The Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids 
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to 
the crime."18s A judge should only perform "intrajurisdictional 
and interjurisdictional analyses" in the "rare case" where "a 
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence 
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."186 
More recently in Ewing, the court again split into three factions, 
a majority (5-4) affirming California's right to its popular "three 
strikes and you're out" life sentence for a career criminal whose 
latest crime was shoplifting three golf clubs. 187 
How can state legislatures impose the same punishment for 
petit theft or drug possession as for aggravated murder without 
violating basic standards of disproportionality? How can a 
Supreme Court tolerate this, and hold it constitutionally 
permissible? Only by ignoring retribution as a limit on 
punishment, and tolerating all but the grossest 
disproportionality. 
The new Model Penal Code's official commentary attacks this 
standard of gross disproportionality that has taken root in 
federal constitutional law by reaffirming the essential 
connection between proportionality and retribution which 
should provide the floor and ceiling to a range of permissible 
184 Id. at 1016 (White, J., dissenting). 
185 Id. at 1001 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 288, 303 (1983)). 
186 Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
187 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 
U.S. 63 (2003). 
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punishments. Essentially unrevised for four decades, the Model 
Penal Code's "new approach" now calls for punishment "within 
a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the 
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of 
offenders. "188 
Proportionality plays a special role in death penalty 
jurisprudence. Here, the Supreme Court more readily limits 
state legislatures by invoking proportionality requirements 
implicit in the 8th Amendment. 
When a bare majority of the Court struck down capital 
punishment in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia,189 inaugurating the 
modern era of death penalty jurisprudence, Justices Brennan 
and Marshall would have held death as punishment per se cruel 
and unconstitutional. For these and like-minded absolutist 
opponents, the death penalty is an inhumane, morally 
disproportionate response to any crime, no matter how heinous. 
Three other Justices in Furman found the death penalty 
unconstitutional because it was "freakishly imposed," "cruel and 
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel 
and unusual," and applied chaotically to a "capriciously selected, 
random handful" - in no proportion and thus cruel and unusual 
punishment.19° Justice Douglas separately condemned the 
death penalty as "disproportionately imposed and carried out 
on the poor, the Negro, and members of unpopular groups."191 
After thirty-five states responded to Furman by re-enacting 
new death penalty statutes, 192 the United States Supreme Court 
warned them again: "the punishment must not be grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime."193 However, "we cannot 
say the punishment [of death] is invariably disproportionate to 
the crime," the Court concluded, restoring the death penalty to 
188 Model Penal Code§ i.02(2)(a)(i) (Discussion Draft April 17, 2006). 
189 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
19° Id. at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
191 Id. at 249-250 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
192 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976). 
193 Id. at 173. 
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the United States.194 "[This] is an extreme sanction, suitable to 
the most extreme of crimes."195 
Death was "indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime 
of raping an adult woman," Justice White declared for a 
plurality in Coker. 196 Dissenting Justices in Coker, who would 
have permitted Georgia to execute rapists, agreed with the 
majority in principle: "I accept that the Eighth Amendment's 
concept of disproportionality bars the death penalty for minor 
crimes," Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 
conceded.197 Whether death is a proportionate response for 
serial child-rapists remains an open question, soon to be tested. 
Five years after Coker, the Supreme Court in Enmund, held 
five to four that death was a disproportionate penalty for a 
getaway car driver who neither intended nor expected his co-
felon to shoot and kill their robbery victim.19s Dissenting, 
Justice O'Connor stated common ground for the Court: "[T]he 
penalty imposed in a capital case [must] be proportional to the 
harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness.''199 A few 
years later, Justice O'Connor found herself in the majority in 
Tison, holding that a reckless and depraved indifference to 
human life without an intent to kill, could make death a 
proportional penalty for a felony-murder accomplice. 200 
Harm and blameworthiness - essential components of 
proportionality - require a particularized consideration of each 
crime and each criminal. Thus, as a constitutional punishment, 
death must not be grossly disproportionate to the crime, and it 
must not be disproportionate to the criminal's particular 
culpability, however measured. 
194 Id. at 187. 
l95Id. 
196 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
197 Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
19s Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
199 Id. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
200 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
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If New Jersey abolished the death penalty and substituted 
life without parole as the Commission recommends, 201 the 
problem of proportionality would hardly disappear. Would 
multiple killers who rape and torture children receive 
proportional punishment by spending the rest of their lives in 
prison, no longer under a sentence of death? Would they get 
what they deserve? Any legislature considering abolishing or 
restoring the death penalty must face this. 
So let's return to the Commission's finding itself: Of course 
abolishing the death penalty "eliminate[s] the risk of 
disproportionality in capital sentencing."202 It eliminates capital 
sentencing entirely, so it eliminates disproportionality as well as 
everything else about the death penalty. 
Surely the Commission would not trivialize the great 
challenge with such literalist cheap tricks. Assume the 
Commission did intend to focus on the real problem of 
disproportionality in punishment. How, then, can it fail even to 
consider whether eliminating the death penalty and substituting 
life without parole for aggravated murder thereby radically 
elevates the risk of disproportionality in the new non-capital 
sentencing regime? 
Supporting its call for abolition under cover of a "risk of 
disproportionality," the Commission pointed out that many 
other aggravated murderers had not been sentenced to death.203 
Under any likely death penalty regime, some will live who 
deserve to die, and some will die who deserve to linger in prison. 
This disproportionality does trouble us retributivist advocates. 
The current statute204 does fail to capture some of the worst of 
the worst. Thus, this witness testified at length and in writing, 
urging a set of statutory reforms to effectuate a more morally 
proportioned death penalty, further reducing the risk of 
executing those murderers who did not deserve to die. 20s Bent 
201 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
202 Id. at 1. 
203 Id. at 46. 
204 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:11-3 (West 2007). See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 
1, at 6-10. 
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on eliminating the death penalty entirely, however, the 
Commission ignored any possible revision. 
Refined definitions have their limit. Juries will spare 
convicted killers whose murders otherwise qualify for death 
because the murderer's own tragic past cries out for mercy. 
Abused as children, deformed by a cruel environment, some 
killers' compelling personal circumstances rightly move a jury to 
spare them. Real proportionality demands individualized 
justice - somewhat erratic, unpredictable, not fully accountable 
by the crime's definition or description. Plato and Aristotle 
called this irregular, individuated justice "equity."206 
Today's penalty phase seeks an equitable, proportional 
justice, case by case, person by person. 
A bit cheeky, then, of Commissioners who cannot imagine 
anyone deserving to die, to use the fact that we allow some 
terrible murderers to live as grounds to spare even those whom 
a jury, considering all personal circumstances, would still 
condemn. 
Does it make sense to abandon completely any attempt at 
proportional, individual justice because we cannot always 
produce it? Confronted with the most egregious killings 
committed from the most despicable motives, should we not do 
what we can, although at other times in other cases, we failed to 
do what we should? 
But give the Commission its due. Luck, rather than desert 
sometimes determines the outcome. At some level, this is true 
throughout life. Innocent victims of violent crime, innocent 
passengers or pedestrians live or die daily based upon 
happenstance. Wrong place, wrong time, wrong prosecutor, 
wrong jury - to some degree luck remains inescapably part of 
life, and death. 
Moral Luck 
That deep phenomenon - "moral luck." Should New Jersey 
confine the death penalty to murder? Many years ago, a killer 
205 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 67-69 (testimony of 
Robert Blecker). 
206 ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE xlii (James E.C. 
Welldon, trans., London, Macmillan 1897). 
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told me the story of an "acquaintance" who raped a woman, 
chopped off her arms and legs, and threw her in the woods, 
bleeding to death. 
Most everyone would agree that whatever a society's ultimate 
punishment, this vicious criminal deserved it. As luck would 
have it, a hunter came upon the victim, who was miraculously 
saved. Should this happenstance - that the victim lived -
having nothing to do with the intention or behavior of the 
criminal dictate a lesser punishment? Should attempted mass 
murderers such as Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, who come 
perilously close to blowing up a plane in flight, 207 be treated any 
more leniently than those who do succeed in killing their 
victims? 
The ancient Greeks and the ancient Hebrews - twin sources 
of Western culture -- were torn by the problem, psychologically 
and jurisprudentially.208 No one has ever come up with a 
completely satisfactory solution. It is impossible to pay full 
attention to the criminal's act and attitude without also paying 
attention to the harm, even though a lesser harm may be 
morally divorced from the actor's intention. It is impossible to 
demand full consistency - treating like cases alike - and at the 
same time respect the individuality of each unique human being. 
The luck of location - county variability, with which the 
Commission briefly wrestled - raises the same issue, but to a 
different level. 209 It may be impossible to demand state-wide 
consistency while respecting local autonomy. At best, we 
acknowledge the problem of moral luck, conduct proportionality 
reviews, and ask of each death sentence in isolation: was it 
deserved? If so, then although others too, in different places at 
different times, warranted but escaped society's ultimate 
sanction, we do what we ought, when we can. 
207 Cathy B. Thomas, Courage in the Air, TIME, Sept. 9, 2002, at 108, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020909/aattendants.html. 
20s See Robert Blecker, Roots Resolving the Death Penalty: Wisdom from 
the Ancients, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL 
SANCTION 169 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2003). 
209 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 43. 
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Demanding regularity under the guise of rejecting 
arbitrariness - luck - ultimately undermines our ability to give 
play to non-rational, but real, incomparables that make up 
equity, real justice. Each case is different and a commitment to 
individual justice must respect that real differences are not 
always rational or discernable in advance. 
The Commission almost never explicitly addressed "justice." 
It never directly faced the central question of proportionality: 
whether a most vicious killer can ever "deserve to die" or does 
s/he always "deserve to live," albeit in prison? These terms of 
great emotional significance would have split Commissioners. 
Considering "justice," "desert" and real "proportionality" would 
have forced those Commissioners to dissent who did feel certain 
the worst of the worst do deserve to die, but reluctantly yielded 
to their feeling of helplessness in ever bringing about the justice 
of death. 
Absolutist opponents would have been forced to reveal 
themselves for who they were, and acknowledge the truth: For 
them it was never an open question. Instead, these 
Commissioners were allowed to go through the motions of 
hearings, apparently making a record, while all the time 
committed to abolition. 
Ultimately, however, they cannot responsibly avoid it; 
proportionality will justify, limit, or condemn capital 
punishment itself. But proportionality, too, will justify or 
condemn substituting life without parole as punishment for 
aggravated murder, a question the Commission seemed 
compelled to face in its seventh finding. 210 Subjecting drug 
dealers or career thieves to life in prison inflicts obscenely harsh 
and thus disproportional punishment. Sentencing child-killing 
rapists to that very same life, without chance of parole, inflicts 
obscenely lenient and thus disproportional punishment. 
210 Id. at 56. 
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FINDING (6) THE PENOLOGICAL INTEREST IN EXECUTING A 
SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONS GUILTY OF MURDER IS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO JUSTIFY THE RISK OF MAKING 
AN IRREVERSIBLE MISTAKE. 211 
Of all disproportionality, the worst imaginable is that the 
state might make a mistake and execute an innocent person. 
This nightmare, however improbable, haunts retributivist 
advocates no less than abolitionists. Whereas utilitarians -
whether favoring or opposing capital punishment - can 
theoretically support executing the innocent for other public 
benefits such as deterrence, retributivists cannot abide it. 
Commissioner Segars put the question strongly: "Isn't the 
fact that you could possibly execute even one innocent person 
worth the cost of deciding upon life without the possibility of 
parole to avoid that ... possible human error?"212 
She also drew attention to Sunstein and Vermeule's recent 
essay, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?, where the 
authors link deterrence to the moral question of executing the 
innocent.213 Given that most recent studies show the death 
penalty, on balance, probably deters more effectively than life 
without parole, doesn't the government by not executing the 
guilty bear responsibility, they ask, for the other innocent 
murder victims whose lives would have been saved by the 
greater deterrent power of death? 214 "[C]apital punishment 
requires a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the 
sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that 
form of punishment," they concluded. 21s 
Thus even if a few innocents were executed, "on certain 
empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally 
211 Id. at 51. 
212 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 147 (Sept. 13, 2006) 
(statement ofYvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
213 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally 
Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2006). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 703 (abstract). 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
required, not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the 
taking of innocent lives."216 Considering the literature and logic 
of deterrence, these authors concluded that "[a]t the very least, 
those who object to capital punishment, and who do so in the 
name of protecting life, must come to terms with the possibility 
that the failure to inflict capital punishment will fail to protect 
life."217 In short, their "central concern is that foregoing any 
given execution may be equivalent to condemning some 
unidentified people to a premature and violent death."21s 
A strictly non-retributive utilitarian whose overarching goal 
was to minimize the deaths of innocents might well uphold the 
death penalty as the only way to go. 
People make mistakes that change the course of human 
events. Few mistakes can be fully reversed. Life itself and the 
process of growing old: not reversible. Life in prison: 
terminable, but not reversible. Yet death is different, 
irreversibly different. Although DNA testing may help insure 
that only the guilty are condemned, it is "not a panacea,"219 and, 
"inevitably, we make mistakes."220 
Still we cannot yet identify and demonstrate among the 
thousand or so, executed during the modern era (1977-2007), 
any factually innocent person. 221 Yet, most tragically, we 
probably have killed at least one and perhaps a few who did not 
commit the murder for which they were condemned. This 
horrible fact hardly substantiates the hyperbole concerning 
innocence permeating abolitionist circles, and occasionally 
216 Id. at 705. 
217 Id. at 708. 
21s Id. 
219 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 19 (testimony of Barry C. 
Scheck). 
22° COMM'N MEETINGS, supra note 22, at 40 (statement of R. Erik Lillquist). 
221 See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2533 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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repeated in the hearings: "innocent people [are] being executed . 
. . throughout this country."222 
Abolitionists on the Commission produced witnesses from 
other states with moving accounts of how they were 
"exonerated" while imprisoned, sometimes having been 
condemned to die.223 Some of these witnesses probably were 
factually innocent; perhaps all were. We don't know. We do 
know that these exonerees blithely listed other "innocents" 
along with themselves. 224 
Witness Roberto Melendez Colon, whose testimony 
Commissioner Segars found "compelling,"22s listed Benny 
Demps as one of "four right from the top" on Florida's death row 
who, like him, were "innocent" yet condemned. 226 
I happened to witness the people of Florida put Benny 
Demps to death. His victims, the Puhlicks, were good, 
upstanding folk. 227 Dubbed "the flower lady" in the 
neighborhood, she dreamed of retiring to Florida with her 
contractor husband. They worked hard - he, as a carpenter and 
she, sometimes cleaning houses - to put the kids through 
college. 
Mrs. Puhlick's cousin, a real estate agent, called them about a 
"handyman's special" that included a neglected orange grove. 
So the Puhlicks went to Florida and drove down the driveway to 
see their dream house. As luck would have it, Benny Demps and 
222 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 9 (testimony of N.J. Sen. 
Raymond J. Lesniak). 
223 Id. at 103 (testimony of Roberto M. Colon); Public Hearing Before the 
N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 60 (Sept. 27, 2006) (testimony of Kirk 
Bloodsworth), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear 
/dpsco92706.pdf Oast visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
224 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24 at 103, 107-108 (testimony 
of Roberto M. Colon). 
225 Id. at 145 (testimony of Yvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty 
Study Comm'n). 
226 Id. at 108. 
227 Symposium, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who 
Deserves Death? 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 175-76 (2002) (citing Telephone 
Interview with the Puhlick Family (Apr. 11, 1999)) [hereinafter Symposium]. 
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an accomplice had just robbed a house nearby, taken the safe to 
an abandoned orange grove to open it, when unexpectedly the 
Puhlick's car drove down that road. Demps pulled a gun, and 
announced a stickup. 
Mrs. Puhlick fumbling nervously for her wallet, dropped a 
lipstick from her pocketbook. As she instinctively bent to 
retrieve it, Demps shot her in the stomach. Demps forced Mr. 
Puhlick to remove the spare tire from their car and climb back 
in. Next he forced the real-estate agent cousin in. And finally, 
Mrs. Puhlick, bleeding profusely, was forced into the trunk. 
Demps slammed the trunk shut. And before he left that orange 
grove, hearing the desperate cries of the three locked inside, 
Benny Demps riddled the trunk with bullets, killing Mrs. 
Puhlick and the cousin, both of whom absorbed bullets meant 
for her husband, who lived to corroborate overwhelming 
forensic evidence of Demps' guilt. 
Eventually Demps was apprehended with the murder 
weapon in the trunk of his car. 22s The eyewitness identification 
- not a fleeting glance but a sustained encounter - further 
confirmed guilt beyond all shadow of a doubt.229 Benny Demps 
was a cold blooded, depraved murderer. And so a Florida jury 
sentenced him to die.23° But then in 1972 the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Furman, holding unconstitutional the death 
penalty as administered across the country.231 So the states 
released into general population all condemned, including 
Benny Demps.232 
Now a lifer inside, Demps killed a fellow prisoner, perhaps a 
prison "snitch."233 Because of his prior history, a Florida jury 
again sentenced Demps to die.234 The evidence was enough to 
22s Demps v. State, 272 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1973). 
229 Symposium, supra note 227, at 176. 
2 3° Demps, 272 So. 2d at 804; see also Symposium, supra note 227, at 176. 
2 31 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2 32 Demps v. State, 761 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2000); see also Symposium, 
supra note 227, at 176. 
2 33 Demps, 761 So. 2d at 303. 
2 34 Id. 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
convict, barely.2 35 This prison killing, in isolation, in my view 
did not deserve death. His earlier murders however, did qualify 
Benny Demps to die. And this time the People of Florida killed 
him. 2 36 
Suppose Demps, as he claimed, had not personally stabbed 
the victim inside the prison? Had Florida executed an 
"innocent" man? Hardly. It may be politically incorrect to 
declare, it may be legally incorrect, but morally not all 
"innocence" is equivalent. David "Itchy" Brooks serves a life 
sentence for a murder I believe he did not commit. But he 
detailed to me many of the fifty-seven people he shot when he 
was nineteen years old.2 37 If Itchy had been executed for the 
murder for which he serves a life sentence but likely did not 
commit, Washington, D.C. would have executed an "innocent" 
man who nevertheless deserved to die. 
Other notorious street thugs around the country may have 
been factually innocent of the particular murders for which they 
were convicted. In Lorton Prison they used to say, "Maybe you 
serve time not for what you have done all the time, but all the 
time you serve, you serve for what you've done."2 3s Whether or 
not Demps stabbed that fellow prisoner to death, it defiles the 
seriousness of innocence to claim, as the Commission witness 
did, 2 39 that Florida executed an "innocent man." Killing a 
murderer like Benny Demps was justice - at least poetic justice. 
Executing the truly innocent horrifies us retributivists. We 
must do nearly all we can to prevent it. "Abolishing the death 
penalty will not ensure [that] no innocent person will be 
convicted," the Commission conceded, "but it would ensure that 
no innocent person will be killed by the State."24° By parity of 
235Id. 
2 36 Rick Bragg, Florida Inmate Claimed Abuse in Execution, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 9, 2000, atA14. 
2 37 Interview with David "Itchy" Brooks, Lorton, Va. (1986-1990). 
2 38 Robert Blecker, Haven Or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: 
Experiences of Punishment Justified 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1166 (1990). 
2 39 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 107-8 (testimony of 
Roberto M. Colon). 
24° COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. 
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reasoning, abolishing life in prison could not ensure that no 
innocent person will be convicted, but it would ensure that no 
innocent person will be imprisoned for life by the state. Of 
course, as the Commission report noted, not having executed 
anybody in twenty-four years, 2 41 New Jersey surely has not 
executed any innocent person during that period. 
However grudgingly, abolitionist witnesses had to concede to 
Commission members, that there has "not been an exoneration 
of anyone who has been sentenced to death in New Jersey."2 42 
New Jersey's death row houses no factually innocent 
condemned. 2 43 Nor did New York's, before the New York Court 
of Appeals found a tiny part of its statute unconstitutional. 2 44 
Nor does anybody on Oregon's death row even claim factual 
innocence. 2 45 
The point is, with well-funded defense counsel, and a 
carefully designed and administered death penalty, we can be 
nearly certain that the error rate will approach zero. But luck 
counts, and people sometimes make mistakes. Life itself is risky. 
We constantly measure and balance risks, including deadly risks 
- rejecting most, but taking a few. 
Suppose we further balance the risk of making irreversible 
mistakes against the reward - the "penological interest" in 
executing the worst of the worst, who the Commission finding 
euphemistically calls "a small number of persons guilty of 
murder."2 46 
2 41 Id. at 86. 
2 42 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 23 (testimony of Edward 
J. DeFazio, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
2 43 Id.; Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 42 (testimony of 
Robert Blecker). 
2 44 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Cahill, 
809 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 2003); People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053 (N.Y. 2004); 
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Taylor, 747 N.Y.S.2d 
318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)). 
2 45 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 42 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker); Joshua Marquis, Department: Parting Thoughts: A Just Punishment, 
62 OR. ST. B. BULL. 62 (2002). 
2 46 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. 
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How much weight should we give to the mistake of keeping 
alive those who most deserve to die? Most Commissioners 
would give the justice of condemning to death those who 
deserve to die no weight at all. Those who dismiss retributive 
justice as revenge, or see it as an irrational psychological 
curiosity, could never feel the "compelling" effect of death as 
ultimate justice to offset any risk, however small. 
And how much risk was there, really that New Jersey will 
execute the truly innocent? What risk should we tolerate? 
Abolitionists love to publicly press us proponents to quantify 
"tolerable error." During my question-and-answer session, 
Commissioner Segars demanded this: 
"Sir, I just need to understand that what I hear you 
say is that the execution of an innocent person is 
the cost of doing business if you want to uphold 
the death penalty? Yes, or no?" 2 47 
"No. The remote, remote possibility of the 
execution of an innocent person is the cost of 
doing justice. "248 
"The point is innocent," Ms. Segars pressed. 
"That's the point."2 49 
"[Your] children are innocent," this witnesses 
replied, "and yet you will expose them to a risk of 
death for your own convenience"2s0 by walking 
with them in a double stroller down the street 
where there is a slightly greater chance that a truck 
will jump the curb and kill them. 2s1 
If we readily expose our own lives and those we love most to 
an infinitesimal risk of death for the sake of momentary 
convenience, surely for the sake of justice we should reluctantly 
2 47 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 70-71 (testimony of 
Yvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
2 48 Id. at 71 (testimony of Robert Blecker) (emphasis added). 
2 49 Id. (testimony of Yvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study 
Comm'n). 
2 5° Id. (testimony of Robert Blecker). 
2 51 See id. at 70. 
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expose convicted murderers we most despise to a tiny chance of 
unwarranted death. 2 52 
Reverend Howard used his prerogative as Chair firmly to 
dismiss this comparison as "apples and oranges," and shut down 
the discussion. 2 53 
But these same folks, so eager to press us for some callous-
sounding quantifiable risk we are willing to take, themselves 
avoid quantifying the real risk we should take in other serious 
situations. What risk would they tolerate that we might 
imprison for life a truly innocent person? Or consign to death 
whole families because we decline to spend the extra money to 
make our roads or autos safer? 
By not balancing risks to maximize justice, not balancing 
errors against each other, almost completely ignoring 
retribution which should have been its central concern, the 
Commission report begs the question and simply declares, 
"executing a small number of persons guilty of murder" could 
not "justify the risk of making an irreversible mistake."2 54 
Our concern goes well beyond those two or three dozen 
factual innocents in the United States at one time or other 
wrongly sentenced to death, although eventually released from 
death row. We include among those disproportionately 
condemned, the hundreds of guilty murderers who landed on 
death row although they did not deserve to die. Again, to greatly 
reduce the number, this witness suggested refining the statute, 
including elevating the burden of proof. 2 55 Instead, the 
cumulative effect of the Commission's parade of exonerated 
convicted criminals with tales of their "innocent" colleagues, 2 56 
may have given undecided Commissioners a misimpression that 
false condemnation of true innocents across the country is 
252 Id. 
253 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 72. 
2 54 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added). 
2 55 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 67-69 (testimony of 
Robert Blecker); Robert Blecker, A Road Not Considered, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. (forthcoming 2008). 
2 56 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 103 (testimony of 
Roberto M. Colon). 
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common, instead of an extraordinarily rare phenomenon 
elsewhere and happily unknown in New Jersey during the 
modern era. 
In the end, issuing its sixth finding, the Commission's one-
sided report failed to discuss or measure, much less balance the 
remote risk of executing an innocent against the certainty of 
letting many live in prison who deserve to die. 257 
FINDING (7) THE ALTERNATIVE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY INSTITUTION WITHOUT THE 
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE WOULD SUFFICIENTLY ENSURE 
PUBLIC SAFETY AND ADDRESS OTHER LEGITIMATE SOCIAL 
AND PENO LOGICAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING THE INTERESTS 
OF THE FAMILIES OF MURDERVICTIMS. 2 58 
If the state abolishes the death penalty, will life without 
parole "sufficiently ... address .. .legitimate ... penological 
interests"?2s9 
"[T]here is no such thing as closure. There can only be 
justice," Commissioner Garcia had declared on behalf of victims' 
families.26° "My concern is, if the death penalty were to be 
eliminated in the State of New Jersey, will these families truly 
receive ... justice?"261 
Abolitionist witnesses early in the hearings characterized life 
without parole as "very dire punishment."262 "My mother was 
beaten, sodomized, tortured and finally strangled," an 
abolitionist survivor testified. 263 "If the killer were given life 
2 57 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-55. 
2 58 Id. at 56. 
2 59 Id. at 56. 
2 6° Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 32 (testimony of Kathleen 
Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
261 Id. 
262 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 48 (testimony Robert Del 
Tufo). 
2 63 Id. at 12 (testimony of Sandra Place). 
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without parole, and I mean a true life sentence, I would not be 
here."2 64 
But if that tortured victim could somehow watch what we do 
to her rapist murderer - would she approve? How do they live, 
those imprisoned for life who might otherwise deserve to die? 
While this Commission hardly focused their attention on 
whether and when death was undeservedly severe and thus a 
disproportional response, retributivists insisting on "just 
deserts" also force the opposite proportionality question into 
debate: is death's substitute, life in prison, proportionately 
unpleasant for the most callous, sadistic killers? 
Legislators convinced that prison life is nearly unbearable, 
that "life inside is worse than death," may abolish the death 
penalty, erroneously imagmmg they have maintained 
proportionality. An informed public, however, aware that 
sadists who rape and torture children end up watching 
television and playing ping pong may insist, that as 
administered, life without parole destroys the "moral 
proportionality" which only a death penalty can maintain. 
Diverting attention from the quality of life inside prison to 
the length of time spent inside, leading abolitionist witnesses 
such as Professor Robert Johnson tried to heighten the hype 
surrounding life without parole with artful but misleading 
rhetoric: "A better name for this sentence might be death by 
incarceration. "265 
Yes, assuming society retains this punishment - Europe has 
rejected it - those serving life without parole will die in prison. 
But very few will die because of prison. 
We all live, condemned to die, somehow, somewhere. Some 
of us will die in old age in our sleep, or watching television. 
Should we call this "death by sleep" or "death by television"? Or 
is it simply where we die? "Death by home"; "death by 
hospital." "Death by bowling alley"? "Death by incarceration." 
Even Commissioner Garcia, who would have kept the death 
penalty if only we administered it, embraced this powerful but 
misleading rhetoric: "How can we assure survivors that, if we 
2 64 Id. at 15. 
26s Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 57 (testimony of Robert 
Johnson) (emphasis added). 
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[substitute life in prison for death], they will really actually leave 
that prison in a pine box and in no other way?"2 66 
The question of justice - whether life without parole is a 
moral substitute for the death penalty - can be answered not by 
focusing on where the vicious killers die, but how they live while 
incarcerated. 
This witness, almost alone, begged the Commission to turn 
its attention from the length of the punishment to the quality of 
the day-to-day experience for those serving life without parole: 
"[I] urge you ... do not make your decision in a vacuum .... 
You have an obligation to understand .. the quality of life for 
those who serve life without parole."2 67 We must determine 
whether death-spared lifers constantly feel punished, and 
whether their lives are made miserable inside. 
The New Jersey Department of Corrections official website 
boldly declares their own "mission:" To "ensure that all persons 
committed to the state correctional institutions are confined 
with the level of custody necessary to protect the public and that 
they are provided with the care, discipline, training, and 
treatment needed to prepare them for reintegration into the 
community."2 6s 
Punishment? It's not a part of the Department of 
Corrections' officially stated mission. Nor was it in Tennessee, 
or Oklahoma (or Illinois) where this witness spent days 
documenting life inside maximum-security prisons, watching in 
disbelief as mass murderers played softball, volleyball, ping 
pong, and chess. How would surviving family members in New 
Jersey feel if they knew that child-killers serving life spent much 
of their days watching sporting events and soap operas on color 
television? 
Consistent with New Jersey's Administrative Code, and what 
the Corrections public information officer assured me, my oral 
testimony suggested that well-behaved prisoners serving life 
266 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 47 (testimony of 
Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
267 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 45 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
2 68N.J. DEP'T OF CORRS., MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.state.nj.us 
/corrections/about_us/html/mission.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007). 
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without parole in New Jersey, as in other states, could end up 
inside an even less restrictive medium security prison. 2 69 
"[You have] heard ... heart[-]wrenching testimony from the 
victim's families, saying ... [i]f only you had life without parole . 
. . [w]e could move on with our lives," this witness intoned.2 7° 
"Could they move on with their lives if they really understood 
what the quality of life is for those who do actually serve life 
without parole day[-] to[-] day? You owe it to yourself to find 
that out."2 71 
After respectful but sharp questioning from Commission 
members hostile to a retributive point of view, my live testimony 
concluded: "[I] beg you, look into the conditions [of] life 
without parole and [you may] realize it's yet a crueler hoax " 
than a death sentence pronounced but never carried out. 2 72 At 
this point, the Chair ended the exchange. 2 73 
Apparently responding to my plea, in its final hearing, the 
Commission sought assurance from the New Jersey Department 
of Corrections that those serving life without parole do live a 
tough life inside maximum-security prison. 2 74 "[C]an you tell us 
what is the meaning of a sentence of life without parole?" 
Commissioner Coleman asked James Barbo, Director of 
Operations for the New Jersey Department of Corrections. 2 75 
"One of the prior speakers indicated that in some jurisdiction[s] 
- and he even suggested that he would expect the same to be 
true in New Jersey - that persons sentenced to life without 
269 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 46 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
2 7° Id. at 47. 
271 Id. 
2 72 Id. at 56. 
273 Id. 
2 74 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 56 (testimony of James 
H. Coleman, Jr., Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
2 75 Id. at 56. 
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parole virtually live under hotel conditions. Can you comment 
on that?"2 76 
"[I] worked in New Jersey State Prison for [eleven] years, 
and I wouldn't describe it at all as a hotel," the Operations 
Director assured the Commission. 2 77 He continued: 
I was in on a Sunday afternoon just to see how 
things were going, and I was watching the mess 
move for dinner. And I was standing in the 
rotunda watching the units go by ... [a]nd they 
were just taking that monotonous walk into the 
dining hall to get their meal and to come back. 
Their hair turned gray like mine did since I left. 
But there is a very debilitating, monotonous 
lifestyle in a prison. Yes, inmates have television 
access, they have educational programs, we have 
social services programs. But life at New Jersey 
State Prison is very debilitating to inmates. 2 78 
We all get older, at least those of us fortunate enough to live 
out our lives. Our hair turns grey if we are fortunate enough to 
keep it. Even as a metaphor, this hardly demonstrates that life 
without parole is justice, or that life at New Jersey State Prison 
is "very debilitating" to inmates. 2 79 
"One of the witnesses came in earlier in our testimony, and 
equated a life in prison as a day at the beach and volleyball 
camp," Commissioner Segars said, stretching my testimony a 
bit, but focusing the inquiry.2 8° "And what other kinds of things 
can you talk about in terms of their day-to-day existence?"2 81 
2 76 Id. at 58. 
2 77 Id. at 58. (testimony of James Barbo). 
2 78 Id. at 59. 
2 79 Id. at 58. 
280 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 61 (testimony of Yvonne 
S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
281 Id. at 61. 
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"Well, there is recreation," the Operations Director replied 
literally, "but there is no volleyball. I can tell you that. There is 
the usual weight[-]lifting, basketball, that type of thing."2 82 
Next up at that final day's hearing, Gary J. Hilton, former 
Warden at the New Jersey State Prison and one-time Acting 
Commissioner, testified, "thoroughly endors[ing]" and repeating 
Dr. Johnson's earlier "death by incarceration" trick, while 
assuring the Commissioners that New Jersey State Prison was 
extremely well-managed and extremely secure.2 83 Retributive 
death penalty proponents can readily concede safe, secure 
prison management, yet have serious doubts that a prison 
experience justly punishes vicious killers well-behaved once 
inside. 
Obviously, for abolitionist scholars and these ranking 
Corrections officials, life without parole was punishment 
enough. "I can personally think of nothing more horrific than 
contemplating and enduring the process of growing old in a 
maximum[-]security prison," Hilton assured the 
Commissioners. 2 84 
Really? How about being raped, then tortured to death? 
"[C]arefully review and consider what Dr. Johnson and I 
have had to say about the realities of life in prison and dying in 
prison," the former Corrections Commissioner closed his 
testimony.2 8s "I am confident that you will share my conviction 
that true life without parole provides a real and powerful 
measure of retribution. I thank you."2 86 At least Hilton had 
mentioned retribution, if only to assert that life in prison 
satisfied it. 
The Chair left little doubt that these Corrections officials had 
done as they were asked: "The reason why we've invited you to 
speak about this is to characterize, as best you can, life in prison 
for the rest of your life. . . . Because it has been suggested by 
2 82 Id. (testimony of James Barbo). 
283Jd. at 64-65 (testimony of Gary J. Hilton). 
284 Id. at 66. 
2 8s Id. at 67. 
286 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 67. 
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previous witnesses that there is something of a less punitive 
environment, and you're here today to correct that 
impression."2 87 
"[T]here is real and powerful retribution in having an 
individual spend the rest of their life and die in prison," insisted 
Hilton. 2 88 "[I] wanted to drive that point home. That's what it 
means, no ifs, ands or buts."2 89 
"I'd just like to add," said Director Barbo, "to me, the 
punitive aspect is the confinement."2 9° 
Ranking corrections officers across the country typically 
declare this to me. The Court punishes by sentencing. The 
purpose of prison is not punishment. The prisoner goes to 
prison as punishment, not for punishment. The punishment is 
the loss of liberty through confinement. Period. And 
confinement there would be. But these Corrections officials had 
far from established that a life in prison was proportional 
punishment for vicious killers who may deserve to die. 
"I've spent hundreds of hours in five states now with video 
cameras - [I've had] full access to document ... the daily life of 
people who serve life without parole. . . . I haven't gone into 
New Jersey [prisons]; I'm trying to," this witness had testified 
ear lier. 2 91 
Unlike Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, D.C. and Illinois, 
the New Jersey Department of Corrections repeatedly refused 
me permission to interview prisoners, or bring in a video 
camera, or extensively document life inside. They did, however, 
allow me a brief tour of New Jersey State Prison, accompanied 
by a phalanx of ranking staff, including the Administrator 
herself, who did answer my questions, however curtly, as long as 
I made no reference to any testimony before the Commission. 
2 87 Id. at 72-73 (testimony of Rev. M. William Howard, Jr., Chairman, N.J. 
Death Penalty Study Comm'n). 
2 88 Id. at 73 (testimony of Gary J. Hilton). 
289 Id. at 73. 
2 9° Id. at 72 (testimony of James Barbo). 
2 91 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 45 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
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Although the Department knew my mission was to absorb 
and assess the quality of daily "life inside" - perhaps 
coincidentally - during my entire tour, which they scheduled 
from eleven a.m. to one p.m., no prisoner was feeding in the 
dining room they showed me, no prisoner was visiting, no 
prisoner was exercising in the gym or outdoors in the yard on a 
sunny spring day. As we walked down the prison corridors, 
inmates spotting a group of ranking staff with a stranger among 
them, pressed themselves against a wall to let us pass. Thus it 
was impossible to get a feel for life inside. 
But it should be stated: This maximum[-]security prison 
facility itself did seem much less cheerful than most others this 
witness has documented. Industry, the Administrator informed 
me, has been removed from New Jersey State Prison, thus 
diminishing the inmates' opportunity to spend their days 
working outside their cells. The outdoor yard was broken into 
smallish sections with a basketball court and weights, but no 
track or volleyball court or softball field, often found in other 
states' maximum-security institutions. No grass or flowers or 
any greenery existed inside the prison for inmates to walk upon 
or touch. The exercise yard has been "concreted," the 
Administrator explained, because prisoners were planting 
weapons in the dirt. 
The large gym lacked sports scenes painted on the walls of 
some other facilities, although the dining hall was decorated 
with large, well-painted murals. Small cells looked and felt 
bleak, but color televisions did adorn them. And as the 
Administrator (or Captain) informed me proudly, inmates 
routinely did get to watch first-run movies, sometimes before 
the public got to see them, piped in by the prison television 
system. And they did get all sorts of goodies from the 
Commissary. 
Perhaps New Jersey State Prison, as former Warden Hilton 
had testified before the Commission, was "[b]y its very nature .. 
. a cold, dangerous and frightening environment." My brief tour 
left me unable to evaluate that characterization. 
One particular statement Hilton had made to the 
Commission did seem at odds with everything prisoners and 
staff had told me during thousands of hours inside maximum-
security prisons in six states these past twenty-two years: "As 
offenders age and become more infirm, they become more likely 
targets of abuse and intimidation by the younger population. 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
The prison culture has no respect or deference to its senior 
counterparts. Older inmates are routinely strong[-]armed for 
their meager personal assets - tobacco, hard candy, and 
coffee."2 92 Hilton recounted how older inmates, terrified, would 
wait until the younger ones went to exercise before they felt safe 
enough to take a shower, forfeiting their own recreation time.2 93 
While the Administrator pointedly refused to comment on 
her predecessor's Commission testimony, she did flatly deny 
that younger inmates routinely prey upon older ones. But 
Hilton's unrebutted testimony may have had its intended effect. 
Perhaps some Commissioners imagined a life without parole, 
where today's vicious killers, years later, would have morphed 
into elderly prisoners afraid to leave their cells, at last feeling the 
terror they had inflicted years before on their own unwilling 
victims, thus finally getting their just deserts. If Commissioners 
did rely upon this testimony, they were almost certainly misled. 
Overall, my quick tour did confirm that New Jersey State 
Prison was no "beach club" and was seemingly less pleasant 
than similar maximum-security prisons in other states so far 
visited. That tour, however, leaves unanswered essential 
questions: Is life without parole proportionate punishment for 
today's death-eligibles? Is it punishment enough? 
Most disturbing, in New Jersey State Prison, as with every 
maximum facility thus far visited, a well-behaved prisoner's 
daily life inside in no way reflects the gravity of the crime 
committed on the outside. Sentences inside the prison may vary 
in length, but they are consciously uniform in intensity. As the 
Administrator confirmed, convicted aggravated murderers 
serving life without parole get the same privileges as car thieves 
or any other inmate. 
While disavowing any general mission to punish, the 
Administrator conceded that prisoners were punished who 
violated prison rules. They would be placed in the 
administrative segregation unit, deprived of privileges afforded 
the rest of the prison population. But once again, this "deserved 
2 92 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 66 (testimony of Gary J. 
Hilton). 
293Jd. at 71-72. 
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punishment" had nothing whatsoever to do with the crime on 
the outside for which the inmate did time. 
Impatiently waiting for me to leave at the end of the tour, 
offhandedly responding to my casual parting question, the 
Administrator gave a most revealing answer. Many inmates not 
serving life without parole, but with extended sentences for 
serious but lesser crimes at New Jersey State Prison, become 
eligible to transfer to less secure, ostensibly less restrictive 
facilities, yet relatively few apply. Why? "They become used to 
the structure, the routine, the security," the Administrator 
explained with a touch of pride. 
This brief tour revealed nothing to make me doubt an 
inconvenient but essential truth: In a thousand ways every day, 
aggravated murderers who otherwise deserve to die, but now 
instead will live their lives inside without parole even under 
present conditions, do feel pleasure, satisfaction and relief. 
Everyday, like so many of us, they will watch the news, root for 
their favorite sports teams on television, watch movies, read 
books, play basketball, lift weights, and otherwise enjoy life's 
simple pleasures - eat palatable food, marvel at cloud 
formations, feel the warmth of the sun. In short, their lives 
assume new meaning, offer new satisfactions - they laugh, they 
cry, they hurt, they strive, they grieve. And celebrate. 
Over-projecting a hellish life for lifers inside maximum-
security prison, the Commission failed to consider their and our 
"psychological immune system," as Professor Jeremy 
Blumenthal calls it. 2 94 Well-known studies reveal that although 
we might expect lottery winners to be ecstatic and maintain 
their joy from sudden new wealth, while accident victims 
permanently paralyzed live very despondent lives thereafter, it 
turns out not to be.2 95 Long term, people's sense of well-being, 
their enjoyment of life returns to the status quo ante. 2 96 Self-
reporting studies among these groups and others reveal the 
nearly universal human tendency for "hedonic adaptation" with 
2 94 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of 
Affective Forecasting, So IND. L.J. 155 (2005). 
2 9s Id. at 167-168. 
296 Id. at 168. 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
the passage of time.2 97 Long term, social and physical support 
systems and other factors combine to lessen the impact of harsh 
environments. 2 98 Studies of death row inmates show what my 
own extensive interviews confirm - contrary to popular belief, a 
"general sense of well-being" pervades this "new normal."2 99 
Obviously, however, the Commission believed the 
Department's testimony that life spent inside New Jersey State 
Prison is terribly harsh. Responding perhaps to this witness's 
concerns of injustice from a too-pleasant life spend inside 
prison, and his claim that death-eligible convicts, well-behaved 
inside, could be transferred to even less punitive settings, the 
Commission departed from standard practice across the United 
States. Ordinarily the executive branch - especially the 
Department of Corrections - decides whether and when to 
transfer a well-behaved lifer to a less restrictive setting. This 
Commission, however, has recommended specific legislation, 
perhaps from a sense of political appeal, or maybe from a sense 
of justice, that would preclude the Corrections Department from 
transferring a death-eligible prisoner sentenced to life without 
parole to a less punitive setting: "Based on our findings, the 
Commission recommends that the death penalty in New Jersey 
be abolished and replaced with life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, to be served in a maximum security 
facility ."3°0 
Meanwhile, many families of murdered victims will grieve 
the loss of their loved ones. They and we, their fellow citizens, 
feel haunted by the voices of these tortured victims, which call 
out to us for a justice no longer even threatened. Patricia 
Harrison counseled the Commission about the lasting effect of 
her sister's murder upon her grieving family: "Walk in my shoes 
or the shoes of the many living victims of this crime. Only then 
could you experience the unfairness and grief caused by missing 
2 97 Id. at 168-169. 
2 9s Id. at 175. 
2 99 Id. at 169. 
3oo COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 67 (emphasis added). 
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a loved one while having the knowledge that the killer continues 
to enjoy life."3°1 
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION: A PERSON 
CONVICTED OF [AGGRAVATED] MURDER SHALL BE 
REQUIRED TO PAY RESTITUTION TO THE NEAREST SURVIVING 
RELATIVE OF THE VICTIM.3°2 
The Commission took it upon itself, as it had every right to 
do, to add this recommendation to their principal proposal to 
abolish the death penalty and substitute life without parole in a 
maximum-security facility - at present, the New Jersey State 
Prison.3°3 
Who could quarrel with the popular and politically expedient 
recommendation to spend more money on victims' services? 
But the Commission went beyond this. 
Exactly how was a convicted aggravated murderer sentenced 
to life without parole supposed to earn the money to pay the 
victims' families inside New Jersey State Prison, which had shut 
down industry? Prisoners pursue the very few jobs available, 
which more than generating money for Commissary, also gets 
them out of their cell. Would the Corrections Department 
implement the Commission's recommendation by saving the 
scarce, highly prized jobs for the worst killers, thus once again 
perversely undermining retributivism? Or would they transfer 
these aggravated murderers to facilities that offered better 
employment opportunities? 
Beyond its practical problems, the Commission's proposal 
undermines fundamental moral principles of Western culture. 
From earliest times, a victim's family responded to homicide. 
They would retaliate if they could; or in lieu of that, they might 
accept a "blood price" as a settlement, buying the killer peace 
and the victim's survivors some measure of satisfaction.3°4 
3°1 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 19 (testimony of Patricia 
Harrison). 
3°2 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 76. 
3o3 Id. at 76-77. 
3o4 See generally Blecker, Roots Resolving the Death Penalty: Wisdom 
from the Ancients, supra note 208 at 180. 
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All other pre-Biblical Near Eastern cultures allowed the 
victim's family or the community to settle up, accepting 
monetary compensation for their loss in lieu of punishment.3°s 
Seemingly, moral guilt was irrelevant. The slayer was simply 
worth more alive, perhaps as a slave - or by the Commission's 
proposal, a lifer inside. For utilitarians it has always been about 
costs and benefits. The blood price worked: no one complained, 
and anyway, "why cry over spilt blood?" Just put it behind us, 
profit from it, and move on. 
Although the Old Testament favors defendants when it 
comes to proving capital homicide, it changes tone when 
punishing it, refusing to allow murderers to live, who deserved 
to die: "These things shall be a statute and ordinance to you 
throughout your generations," declared the Old Testament, 
emphatically laying down the law.3°6 "[Y]ou shall accept no 
ransom for the life of a murderer who is [guilty], [but he shall] 
be put to death."3°7 
Thus the ancient Hebrews recognized that money can never 
truly compensate for murder. They also embraced its moral 
corollary - that no property crime should be capital. By 
refusing to allow the killer to buy his way out, the Old Testament 
taught that individual human life is incommensurably valuable. 
Life has no price: no amount of money given could ever equal 
the value of an innocent life taken. Life was neither expressible 
nor dischargeable in monetary terms. Justice shall not be 
bought; the victim's family shall not be bought off. 
"Accept no ransom"3os in lieu of the death penalty, Numbers 
declares, "for blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be 
made ... , for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of 
[him] who shed it. "309 
At roughly the same time the Hebrews assembled the Bible, 
the ancient Greeks, also repulsed by blood pollution rejected the 
3osJd. 
3°6 Numbers 35:29 (New Revised Standard Version). 
3o7 Numbers 35:31 (New Revised Standard Version). 
30s Id. 
3o9 Numbers 35:33 (New Revised Standard Version). 
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blood price, expressing the ultimate value of human life 
concretely: the convicted murderer must die.310 In the spirit of 
equal justice under law, both the ancient Hebrews and the 
ancient Athenians decreed that nobody bought his way out of 
homicide-no financial settlement. When it came to death as 
crime and death as punishment, a single standard of justice 
prevailed, based upon anger and mercy, but never money. The 
ancients recognized that the dignity of the individual victim 
demanded the death of the killer. 
Thus Western Civilization advanced by abolishing the blood 
price, and extending the death penalty to all who deserved it. 
What can be said for those abolitionists today on the 
Commission who claim human dignity as exclusively their own 
concern, while they also propose their preferred option of life 
without parole plus some direct monetary restitution from the 
killer to the victim's family? Perhaps this recommendation 
unconsciously gratifies the Commissioners' own primitive sense 
of retribution - literally "payback." But the thought of grieving 
families, especially poor ones, financially dependent upon and 
grateful for periodic payments from their loved one's murderer, 
strikes us more thoroughgoing retributivists as simply 
retrograde. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. STATE ABOLITION MAY PRODUCE FEDERAL EXECUTIONS 
Important decisions usually produce unintended 
consequences. If the state legislature abolishes the death 
penalty, of course no one will be condemned to death or 
capitally prosecuted under the revised statute. Increasingly, 
however, the federal government prosecutes aggravated murder 
under federal law, especially in those states without a death 
penalty. Sometimes the local prosecutor, stripped of a capital 
option under state law, turns to the federal government to seek 
death federally. Recently in New York, for example, at the 
initiation of the local prosecutor, a federal jury condemned 
310 See Blecker, Roots Resolving the Death Penalty: Wisdom from the 
Ancients, supra note 208. 
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Ronell Wilson to death for murdering two local undercover 
police officers.311 
Thus, ironically, if the New Jersey legislature abolishes the 
death penalty, the net effect, long term, may be to restore the 
death penalty to New Jersey. 
B. THE MORAL LOGIC OF LIFE WITHOUT PARO LE 
At first glance, the underlying logic of life without parole 
seems plausible enough: "the greater includes the lesser." The 
community's greater power to kill its worst offenders necessarily 
includes a lesser, but still awesome power to imprison them for 
life without possibility of release. 
Life without parole, however, is a very strange sentence when 
you think about it. And the more you do think about it the less 
stable becomes its moral support. While it may represent the 
jury's unanimous second choice - of those who would condemn 
the killer to die, and others who would leave open a possibility of 
redemption from a life spent inside a prison - the punishment 
itself seems at once too little or too much. 
If a sadistic or extraordinarily cold, callous killer deserves to 
die, then why not kill him? We ought to steel ourselves against 
counting all potential future rehabilitation or remorse of the 
most vicious killers. The past cries out and demands it. 
But if we are unwilling to irrevocably extinguish the 
personality of the condemned and the body that goes with it, 
why should we - like Odysseus at the Mast - forever place it 
outside of our own power to reassess? Why should we ignore 
the rich, mature, constructive, vital human being that even the 
most heinous killer may possibly become? If we are going to 
keep the killer alive, why strip him of all hope? 
So, while life without parole may be the closest moral 
approximation states without a death penalty can reach, while 
life without parole may also be the only unanimous compromise 
verdict a bitterly divided jury can reach, and while life without 
parole may be the ultimate sanction this Commission 
recommends, still it does not feel exactly right. 
311 Brick, supra note 164. 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
True, by one logic, the greater includes the lesser. But then, 
too, sometimes by doing less than we might we do more than we 
may. 
C. ABOLITION MAY EXTEND THE REACH OF LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE 
Commissioner Segars, the Public Defender, while 
"embracing" the Commission's primary recommendation to 
abolish the death penalty, issued a separate statement opposing 
the substitution of mandatory life without parole "in countless 
cases in which the death penalty would never otherwise be 
imposed."312 The Commission's proposal, the Public Defender 
explained, will "inevitably captur[e] many cases that never 
would have been prosecuted capitally or resulted in death 
verdicts."313 Because "death is different,"314 states with a death 
penalty provide super due process for everyone charged 
capitally.31s This special care includes a separate penalty phase 
where the jury weighs additional aggravating circumstances 
against mitigating circumstances, after the state has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating 
circumstance at trial.316 As the Public Defender points out, 
under the Commission's recommended procedure, life without 
parole becomes mandatory upon a finding of an aggravating 
factor.317 The defendant can no longer offer mitigating factors, 
and the sentencer no longer has discretion to reject the new 
312 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part). 
313 Id. at 89. 
314 People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 711 (N.Y. 2002). 
31s COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part); 
see also State v. Martini, 901 A.2d 941 (N.J. 2006); People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 
705 (N.Y. 2002). 
316 Id. 
317 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part). 
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ultimate penalty, based upon compelling circumstances of the 
individual defendant.318 
New Jersey already mandates life without parole for the 
murder of police officers and children under fourteen during a 
sexual assault.319 "To expand unnecessarily the categories of 
cases in which discretion is totally removed from the sentencing 
equation would be a grave mistake."320 The Commission's 
proposed legislation, then, creates yet another significant 
unintended consequence: "The number of [additional] 
defendants sentenced to life without parole will be far greater 
than the number currently being sentenced to death."321 Thus, 
as the Public Defender pointed out, if the Commission really 
wanted to "replace" the death penalty with life without parole, it 
should give the sentencer discretion to reject life without parole 
even where an aggravating factor exists.322 
The Public Defender was "particularly concerned" about the 
potential for abuse in applying the "felony murder" aggravator, 
which presently: 
makes it a capital offense to commit a knowing 
and purposeful murder during the commission of 
robbery, burglary, sexual assault, kidnapping, 
arson and carjacking. The vast majority of these 
cases are not prosecuted capitally. Even when they 
are, they infrequently result in death verdicts 
because jurors attribute lesser weight to this 
aggravating factor in relation to the mitigating 
factors offered by the defendant. Mandatory 
imposition of life without parole in every such case 
is the most troublesome example of how the 
Commission's proposed statute goes beyond the 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 90. 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
3 22 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 90. 
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The Public Defender acknowledged prosecutorial "discretion 
under the Commission's model not to seek life without parole in 
certain cases even if aggravating factors apply to the alleged 
facts. However, most of the factors that would typically weigh 
against seeking the death penalty would be diminished with the 
new system."32 4 It would be "easy" for prosecutors to seek life 
without parole.32s Under the proposed legislation, concerns 
about extra trial and appellate costs, mitigating factors or a 
jury's reluctance to impose death "would all disappear. The so-
called sentencing phase would be a formality in almost every 
[felony murder] case .... [T]he jury would have already found 
the defendant guilty of murder, robbery and felony murder. In 
reality, there would be no issue left to deliberate."32 6 
Retributivists should heed the Public Defender's warning. 
The Commission's proposal to abolish the death penalty and 
substitute mandatory life without parole,32 7 apparently merciful, 
really eliminates mercy in cases where it belongs. We who are 
committed to proportionate punishment and individualized 
justice should reject the Commission's morally indiscriminate 
proposal to abolish the death penalty entirely. This witness, on 
behalf of fellow retributivists committed to individualized 
proportional justice, urged the Commission to morally refine the 
death penalty, especially eliminating the felony murder 
aggravator .32 8 
In that same spirit, we join the Public Defender, whether or 
not the death penalty is abolished, rejecting the merciless, 
indiscriminate mandatory life without parole for all those 
convicted of felony murder. 
32 3 Id. at 9i. 
324 Id. 
32sid. 
32 6 Id. at 91-92. 
32 7 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
328 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 57-58 (testimony of 
Robert Blecker). 
Fall2007 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 5:1 
D. THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF DEATH: THE COURAGE TO 
PERSIST 
The lone, brief dissent by a former legislator and primary 
drafter of New Jersey's current death penalty statute32 9 did more 
harm than good, creating a false impression that all sides had 
been represented either by the report itself, or in dissent. The 
lone absentee at this witness's testimony,33° the dissenter 
neither returned phone calls, nor reacted to my prepared 
statement specially e-mailed to him after my testimony. 
Essentially defending "his" statute,331 without really engaging 
the Commission on its fundamental assumptions, he urged the 
state to "face up" to the problems with the administration of the 
current system without making a single specific proposal to 
modify the current regime.332 
Of all additional statements attached to the Report, 
Commissioner Kathleen Garcia's separate concurrence333 pained 
this retributivist most. Sometimes the most difficult splits are 
with those who take all but the last step with you. An ardent 
death penalty supporter in a more perfect world, during the 
hearings Commissioner Garcia repeatedly made clear that she 
had "as much compassion for these perpetrators as they had for 
their unfortunate victim(s)."334 Nevertheless, given the long-
standing bias of "liberal judges" especially on the state's highest 
court,335 "[i]t has long been evident that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court will continue to ensure that no person, 
32 9 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 79-83 (statement of J. John F. Russo, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, dissenting). 
33° COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1; Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 
13, at 1. 
331 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of J. John F. Russo, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n dissenting). 
332 Id. at 82. 
333 Id. at 93-96 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty 
Study Comm'n, concurring). 
334 Id. at 94. 
335Id. 
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regardless of how horrendous the crime(s) committed, will ever 
be executed."336 Thus, because judges would find some way to 
refuse to enforce the law, and to end the endless "agony" of 
victims families waiting for justice to be done, Ms. Garcia on 
behalf of survivors' families voted to end this cruel "joke."337 
Has she thrown in the towel prematurely? At least one death 
penalty has fully cleared the state high court and seems ready to 
proceed to execution of sentence.338 Ironically, New Jersey may 
be the only state with lethal injection Constitutionally 
empowered to administer it. On September 25, 2007 the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Kentucky case to consider 
whether lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment 
because it poses an unconstitutional risk of a too painful 
death.339 In their petition for certiorari, the lawyers for the 
condemned insisted that "without this court's intervention, 
inmates in Kentucky and the rest of the states that carry out 
lethal injections -- except New Jersey -- will die because the 
Departments of Corrections are not adequately prepared to 
reverse the effects of the chemicals. "34o Should the U.S. 
Supreme Court rule in favor of the condemned in this case, 
having already modified its lethal injection procedures, New 
Jersey may be the lone state constitutionally able to execute 
their condemned killers. If only they had the will. 
Of course New Jersey's abolitionist Governor could step in to 
prevent any execution, but he may not want to bear the political 
price, content instead to stack the Commission with his 
336 Id. at 93. 
337 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 94. 
338 State v. Martini, 901 A.2d 941 (N.J. 2006); Robert Schwaneberg, Death 
Penalty Evokes Anguished Debate, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 14, 2006, at 18, 
available at http://www.sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2006 
/Sept2006/storyo5.pdf. 
339 Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), cert. granted, 2007 WL 
2075334 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 007-5439). 
34° Petititon for writ of Certiorari, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2007 WL 
2781088, at *vi, *23 (U.S. July 11, 2007) p. vi, p. 23 (citing In re the Matter of 
Readoption with Amendments of Death Penalty Regulations, 842 A.2d 207 
(N.J. Super. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
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abolitionist appointees. No one's tenure lasts forever. Many 
victims' survivors still believe that justice will be done and 
would retain the penalty to await the outcome.341 Why not await 
a changing Governor and state high court that more nearly 
reflect the will of the people on this issue, and in the meantime 
move forward by morally refining the statute to focus more 
narrowly on the worst of the worst? 
Why prefer a system necessarily unjust in principle to 
another presently unjust in practice? 
Besides, we should recognize the great symbolic significance 
of the death penalty, as this witness urged.342 The Public 
Defender's separate statement acknowledged the "symbolic 
meaning" specially attaching to life without parole, although in 
fact, many other lifers will be ineligible for release until long 
after they die.343 States such as New Hampshire tenaciously 
cling to their death penalty yet execute no one.344 Why? 
Because symbolic significance attaches when society's 
representatives on a jury choose death. Prisoners have told me, 
years later, how the jury declaration that they were not fit to live 
still pains them.345 
Other Commissioners ignored this witness's plea to count 
the death penalty's symbolic significance. Commissioner Garcia 
at least took it seriously, if only to reject it: "While Professor 
Blecker[] . . . indicated the death penalty statute was of value 
even if it is never carried out, there can be no sense of justice for 
341 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 52 Oetter from Marilyn 
Flax, victim's survivor). 
342 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 55 (testimony of Robert 
Blecker). 
343 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 90 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part). 
344 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (2007); Murder Cases Revive Doubts 
About New Hampshire Death Penalty, THE UNION LEADER, July 17, 2007, at 
BS. 
345 See, e.g., Interview with Rick Smith, prisoner on Oklahoma's Death Row 
in Lorton Central Prison, in Washington D.C. (Nov. 20, 2004). 
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survivors if the sentence they receive and embrace, no matter 
what that may entail, is never served."346 
Alright. Suppose for the foreseeable future, as 
Commissioner Garcia insists, the courts will block executions. 
Why not satisfy the desires of victims' families for real justice? 
Why not attach special punitive conditions to daily life for those 
Condemned? Day to day, really, keep the connection between 
the monstrous crime and society's response. Design and 
administer a separate punitive setting, resembling 
administrative segregation today - but no longer reserved for 
those who violate prison regulations inside, however petty. 
Extend punitive segregation to those who committed the most 
vicious, callous and sadistic killings on the outside -
permanently. 
Abolitionists, of course, have embraced the Commission's 
report, trumpeting it as thoughtful and complete. Hopefully this 
reply should raise real doubts if it does not convince honest 
observers that the Commission majority, abolitionist and anti-
retributive, conducted hearings and filtered evidence to beg the 
question: is justice served specially and uniquely by killing those 
who most deserve to be condemned? 
A majority of the people of New Jersey feel that justice 
requires a death penalty.347 Simply ignoring the popular will, 
however, a few days after the November 2007 elections, 
legislative leaders announced they would act on the 
Commission's report, complete "unfinished business" and rush 
abolition through a lame duck legislature by January of 2008.348 
346 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, 
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring). 
347 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 68 (testimony of Patrick 
Murray). 
348 Tom Hester, Abolishing N.J. Death Penalty to get Lame Duck 
Treatment, NEWSDAY, Nov. 11, 2007, available at http://www.newsday.com 
/news/localjwire/ne~ersey/ny-bc-nj--legislativeprevie1111nov11,o,1502919. 
story (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). See also, Elise Young, N.J. death penalty 
could be history, RECORD, Nov. 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.northjersey.com/page.php?qstr=eXJpcnk3ZjczN2Y3dnFlZUVFeX 
k2MDcmZmdiZWw3Zjd2cWVlRUV5eTcyMTkoODkmeXJpcnk3ZjcxN2Y3dnFl 
ZUVFeXky (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). 
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New Jersey would become a "beacon on the hill," abolitionists 
proclaimed, and a model for other states.349 Perhaps, instead, 
the people might press their representatives someday to really 
consider the question, refine the statute, and punish with death 
only those who most deserve to die. 
349 Tom Hester, N.J. to Vote on Abolishing Death Penalty, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007 /11/09/ AR20071109013oi.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2007). 
